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Ministry Backs U.S. Position on Lockerbie Crash

AU2811085491 Sofia BTA in English 0818 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 28 (BTA)—Late last night Libya's ambassador in Sofia, Mr. Muhammad al-Qammudi, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was received by Bulgaria's minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Stoyan Ganev, who handed him a declaration of the ministry which reads as follows:

"The Republic of Bulgaria condemns terrorism in all its forms. International cooperation in combating such actions is a duty of every state. Terrorism can be effectively eradicated only by the joint efforts of all countries.

"Therefore, we support the joint statement of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in connection with the crash of the Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 which claimed the lives of 270 innocent people from 20 countries. We believe that the Libyan leadership will also accept the statement, thus proving its readiness to do everything possible to clear the truth and punish the culprits, as well as its willingness to combat terrorism.

"We are by no means seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of the Libyan Jamahiriya. We appreciate highly our traditional friendship with the people of Libya. We are solely motivated by our commitment to truth and justice."

Problems concerning bilateral relations were also discussed at the meeting.

PHARE Coordinator Greets European Aid Decision

AU2611182391 Sofia BTA in English 1612 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 26 (BTA)—"Bulgaria's turn has come," Mrs. Mariana Todorova, coordinator of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] Programme for Bulgaria and head of the State Foreign Debt Committee, said on the national radio today, commenting on the decision of the Managing Board of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to adopt a policy to help Bulgaria. The EBRD has so far granted aid to Poland and Hungary.

The policy for Bulgaria was somewhat delayed because the bank waited for the election results, Mrs. Todorova said. The general elections were held on October 13 and two weeks later Sofia was visited by an EBRD mission.

The EBRD policy has several objectives: the promotion of the private sector, privatization and structural adjustment of the state enterprises, the promotion of commercial banks, the crediting of private farmers and the modernization of the Bulgarian village. The EBRD, together with other financial organizations, will help develop Bulgaria's transport, communications and power engineering.

"The EBRD strategy will serve as a framework for our future cooperation," Mrs. Todorova said. "60 percent of the bank's authorized capital has been earmarked for the promotion of the private sector in Eastern Europe," Mrs. Todorova said. She dwelt on the importance of the Bulgarian banks for channelling EBRD funds to the private sector. "The new entrepreneurs should be supported in their business plans, in drawing up their projects. There are a number of technical and practical problems that our banks have failed to settle so far," Mrs. Todorova said.

Zhelev Responds to Subev Statement About Candidacy

AU2711185091 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 27 Nov 91

["Text" of "open letter" from Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev to Union of Democratic Forces National Coordinating Council—read by announcer]

[Text] Esteemed gentlemen, I am addressing you on the occasion of a statement made by Father Khristofor Subev on Bulgarian Television in connection with a discussion on my candidacy for the presidential elections that took place within the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] Coordinating Council.

This raises numerous, substantial questions to which I cannot remain indifferent. I think that there is nothing more natural than when a political force discusses the nomination of its presidential candidate it should request a meeting with him at which he can submit his program. As president until now, my activities are public and well known. I would accept any criticism wherever it may come from, the more so if it comes from the SDS, for reasons that are known to everyone.

However, this is not the question. What I find greatly disturbing about Father Subev's statement is the view he and people who think like him have about the presidential institution in our country. They seem to confuse the election of a president with the election of a secretary general or chairman of some political party. In accordance with the current Constitution and with my own profound personal conviction, which the entire democratic public shares, I hope that the candidate for presidential elections can be nominated by a political organization, but once elected he is obliged to reflect the interests of the people as a whole.

Any demands to link his oath of allegiance to a certain political force and to pledge that he would support only this force, to become its pawn [zalozhnik], while treating all others as aliens, is an absurdity that no person with any self-respect could accept.

I cannot accept this, either.

The presidential institution, which is one of the basic democratic institutions in our country, cannot be subject to the diktat of any political force whatsoever. In the opposite case, the balance in the democratic structures of our country that has just been achieved with so many efforts and pain would be grossly violated.

I have declared on several occasions that I would be greatly honored and that nothing would be more natural for me than being nominated by the SDS, to which I may say that I have contributed my share, even if it sounds boastful.

I am saying this out of respect for the thousands of SDS supporters with whom we marched side by side in overcoming all difficulties and struggling for democracy and tolerance. I am saying this out of my reverance for millions of voters who voted for new Bulgaria.

However, this candidacy should be raised in a manner that should unite all democratic forces in the country, because you realize that honest people in Bulgaria are not only in the SDS. You must believe me that the future president of Bulgaria, and not me personally, if I should be elected, needs this kind of support for the country's sake.

My participation in the election campaign is not a purpose in itself for me. I am not guided by ambitions of power. Throughout several decades, together with many honest people, I never permitted my human dignity to be trampled upon, despite the pressure of communist and police forces. I never permitted that my conscience and my principles should be oppressed. I will not permit such things today.

I know that Mr. Subev's statement does not express the opinion of the entire SDS Coordinating Council, but only the views of certain members. However, the fact that he expressed such opinions in public obliges me to answer in the same manner, I cannot do otherwise.

With my respects,

[Signed] Zhelyu Zhelev.

Zhelev Reaffirms SDS Membership, Goals

AU2511190191 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 19 Nov 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Volen Siderov; place and date not given: "It Is Perfectly Natural That I Should Be the Candidate of the Union of Democratic Forces"]

[Excerpts] [Siderov] The Club in Support of Glasnost and Restructuring in Bulgaria began its activities on 3 November 1988. This was the nucleus of one of several formations belonging to the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], namely of the Federation of Democracy Clubs. On 7 December 1989 the Union of Democratic Forces was established. Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev was one of the founders of the two organizations, their first chairman and universally recognized leader. Zhelev was so kind to share with us his analysis of the past and present events in the period between the anniversaries of the two remarkable dates.

Mr. Zhelev, would you tell us how and for what purpose the Club in Support of Glasnost and Restructuring in Bulgaria was founded 3 years ago?

[Zhelev] Yes, it is really difficult to believe today that the event you are talking about took place only three years ago, because so many things happened in the meantime and so much progress was marked in the development of the democratic process in our country. [passage omitted].

[Siderov] Today you are the president of all Bulgarians, which does not mean that you have become apolitical. Are you still a member of the Federation of Democracy Clubs, which is the successor of the aforementioned club?

[Zhelev] Naturally, being one of its founders I have never ceased to be a member of the federation. The fact that I have no leading function in the Federation of Democracy Clubs is another question. As a matter of fact, Ani Serafimova, a person I sincerely admire and highly respect, is the chairman of the Sofia Democracy Club, where I continue to be a member.

[Siderov] Numerous political organizations and groups outside the SDS are trying to become popular by taking advantage of your name and prestige. Are you a member of any of them?

[Zhelev] Certainly not. I am one of the SDS founders and I was its leader for a long time, therefore I could not be a member of any organization which is not part of the SDS. Another question is that I fully share the philosophy of the SDS about the necessity of cooperating with all democratic parties and movements in the struggle against the remnants of communism.

[Siderov] The SDS emerged as a broad coalition against the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP]. Are you convinced that the SDS has fulfilled its mission, given the election results?

[Zhelev] After the SDS victory in the last elections this mission was fulfilled to a great extent, which does not mean that it is completed. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] which is the successor of the BCP, and a rather similar successor, as a matter of fact, succeeded in winning a large number of votes. Our society continues to live under a strong polarization. All formations which tried to adopt an intermediate position suffered heavy losses in the extreme tension existing between the two poles. All those who voted for noncommunist formations, however, which includes two-thirds of the voters, and even those who did not vote for the blue ballot, actually voted "for" democracy and "against" communism. The overwhelming majority perfectly realized that neither political nor economic reforms are possible as long as the contradiction between democracy and communism has not been solved. The center formations failed in the elections because a normal political arena does not exist yet in our country. There is no normal political life, and this state of affairs is likely to continue as long as the necessary fundamental changes have not been accomplished in Bulgaria.

[Siderov] How will you react if the SDS nominates you as its candidate for the presidential elections?

[Zhelev] I will accept this as a sign that millions of SDS supporters still need my help. Nothing is more natural for me than to be the SDS candidate. Of course, I have

always stated that it would be natural if I should also be supported by the noncommunist formations outside the SDS, by all Bulgarians who want their children to live in a normal country where communism will be nothing but a bad memory. Only in such a case will a normal political atmosphere prevail in our country, with sufficient space for various democratic political parties to compete with each other and even engage in sharp controversies at times. Unfortunately, this is only a dream for the time being, but I am convinced that the people's common sense and foresight will soon make this possible.

KNSB Official on Future Government Relations

AU2611202791 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Interview with Dr. Zhelyazko Khristov, deputy chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, by Petur Donchev at the offices of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Sofia—live]

[Text] [Donchev] The Executive Council of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] has just concluded an expanded extraordinary session. The meeting was closed to journalists, but I now have with me Dr. Zhelyazko Khristov, KNSB deputy chairman.

Dr. Khristov, our listeners and I are interested in hearing the answers to two questions. First, why was the extraordinary meeting of the KNSB Executive Council called?

[Khristov] Today's expanded meeting of the KNSB Executive Council adopted a decision to call an extraordinary meeting of the KNSB Coordinating Council two or three days after the meeting of the Confederative Council of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation that has been announced. Our supreme organ has to discuss and issue pronouncements on two major draft documents: The first of these is the position of the KNSB on the economic and social reform and the defense of hired labor, and the second is its proposal on the forms and mechanisms for social partnership with the government and employers and their trilateral relations in the new situation facing the country.

[Donchev] My second question is: Did the KNSB Executive Council reach any decision on fulfilling the functions of the KNSB National Strike Committee? I have just heard about this, so perhaps you can shed some light.

[Khristov] Yes, this is true. However, this does not imply the freezing or elimination of the National Strike Committee's functions. It is simply to enable us to act more speedily, precisely, and effectively in the new situation, in the event of any spread of regional conflicts, illegal attacks on KNSB property and its cadres, and attempted encroachments by anyone on trade union rights and freedoms.

[Donchev] You mean, in the event of such things happening?

[Khristov] Yes, of course.

[Donchev] I will just add that a special briefing is being called at 0900 GMT tomorrow, at which further details will be given to the mass media.

KNSB Leader Defends Employees' Rights in Letter

AU2611095891 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 20 Nov 91 pp 1, 2

[Letter by Krustyu Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, to Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Council of Ministers: "The Independent Trade Unions Defend"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Dimitrov,

I address you in connection with the implementation of the decision of the National Assembly on structural changes in the Council of Ministers and settling all legal relations related to closing down and transforming ministries, redistributing their functions, and determining the functions of the new ministries.

We are convinced of the need for changes in the state organs, and we believe that they will be implemented while observing the labor laws that are in force. In this context we express the opinion of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] on settling the labor relations of the employees of ministries that have been closed down.

The decision to close down the ministries changes the scope of their activities, while preserving the activities themselves. In other words, the activities continue to be implemented, but the legal subjects who implement them change. Thus, this becomes a case of a change in a judicial person and the scope of his activity (an expansion or narrowing), while the activities themselves are transferred to a new judicial person. Consequently, the labor relations of the employees of the ministries that have been closed down must be settled on the basis of Article 123 of the Labor Code.

Since the case does not involve total liquidation, i.e., the activity itself is not discontinued, in accordance with Article 328 of the Labor Code, there is no reason to interrupt the employees labor relations.

After adopting the structures of the new ministries it is permissible to fire certain employees, as long as the requirements of the Labor Code and the basic criteria related to education, professionalism, and competence are observed.

Esteemed Mr. Chairman,

The opinion I express is the fundamental position of the KNSB, which we insist that you have in mind while structural changes in the country are conducted or contemplated. We are guided by a single goal—respect for the law and striving to prevent social tension.

380,000 Hold One-Hour Warning Strike in Slovakia

AU2911094791 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 26 Nov 91 p 1

["ak"-signed report: "A Warning From Slovakia"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava— A one-hour warning strike, called by the KOVO [metalworkers'] Trade Union, was held between 1300 and 1400 hours in Slovakia yesterday. The warning strike was prompted by dissatisfaction with the results of the [22 November] session of the CSFR Council of Economic and Social Accord.

Almost 380,000 metalworkers were on strike; they received moral support from an additional 30 trade union federations that are members of the Confederation of Trade Unions. At Povazska Bystrica, for example, 6,000 metalworkers participated in the strike, and at Dubnica nad Vahom, 8,000 participated. [passage omitted]

The trade unionists will reportedly compensate for the missed hour of work so that enterprises will incur no losses on account of yesterday's strike. According to P. Jakubik, a representative of the Confederation of Trade Unions, there exists a dialogue with the Slovak Government, but the situation is worse with respect to the Federal Government. It was in response to the Federal Government that the warning strike was held. People are dissatisfied with the declining output and with prices in the shops, which are going up at the expense of the consumer. Agreements concluded at the level of the federal tripartite council are not being honored. Nonetheless, the trade unionists hope that the general agreement for next year will be more realistic for all parties concerned.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 November on page 6 carries the following CSTK report, entitled "Hour of Solidarity": "A total of 450 basic trade union organizations were involved, in various ways, in the protest strike of 25 November. This follows from written reports that these organizations addressed on the mornings of 25 and 26 November to the Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic and to the KOVO Trade Union Federation. The strike of 226 basic trade union organizations in machine building, metallurgy, and electrical engineering was supported by 64 basic trade union organizations in the educational sector. Enterprises of the consumer goods and chemical industries, health care, transportation, mining, retailing, but also culture, joined the strike as well. Participation in the form of a solidarity strike was also announced by nine basic trade union organizations of the KOVO Trade Union Federation from Moravia and by eight from Bohemia."]

ODA, ODU-VPN Form Czech-Slovak Coalition

AU2711141291 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 23 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[CSTK report: "Arguments Must End"]

[Text] Talks on forming the first federal coalition between the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence party (ODU-VPN) are a clear signal of the support for the common state. The chairman of the ODA political board made this statement yesterday at the joint news conference of the ODA and the ODU-VPN in Prague.

"The formation of the first federal coalition is an act of bringing together not only political views but also people. The arguments about the constitutional arrangements are caused in some instances precisely by the isolation of the Slovak and the Czech politicians," Martin Porubjak, chairman of the ODU-VPN added. He also pointed out the excellent cooperation of the two parties in the Federal Assembly. In addition, he insisted that the arguments in the right wing of the political scene must cease, and the results of the parliamentary elections in Poland should serve as a warning.

Federal Economy Minister Dlouhy did not exclude the possibility of a common coalition with the Civic Democratic Party.

"It is well known that some differences exist between them regarding the arrangement of the legislative bodies, for example, or the relation of the government to these bodies. The ODA favors the variant of a two-chamber parliament," Daniel Kroupa said. According to the party representatives and to the outcome of the consultations with partners in Slovakia, it could reinforce and buttress the federal arrangement.

"The Slovak Government statement of 19 November on the necessity of preserving the unity of the state was an extraordinary deed that significantly influenced all the subsequent talks," Dlouhy said. Martin Porubjak commented on the statement by Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky, who said, "The government stance is an empty gesture," saying: "While belittling this stance, he also belittled the entire Slovak Government." He pointed out the difference between the composition of the government and that of the Slovak National Council and, in this context, he admitted the possibility of wide-ranging results of the talks. According to him, the final outcome of the Slovak National Council debate depends on the stand of the Christian Democratic Movement. However, he expressed his confidence that everybody realizes the dangers arising from the disintegration of the state and will act accordingly at the talks. The ODU-VPN chairman also mentioned that the representatives of the Democratic Party and the Hungarian Independent Initiative, with whom they have the best of relations, were informed about the talks with the ODA in advance and agreed to them.

[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 23 November on page 8 in a similar report adds: "The ODA and the ODU-VPN confirm that they have formed the first federal coalition."]

Activity, Results of ODS Congress Reported

AU2911100591 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Nov 91 p 1

["(tma)"-signed report: "Coalition with the Christian Democratic Party Approved"]

[Text] Plzen—The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] Congress approved on 22 November an agreement on an election coalition with the Christian Democratic Party [KDS]. A supplement, not intended for publication, regrading the party membership of the election candidates forms part and parcel of the agreement. According to this supplement, the KDS will have one candidate on a common ticket in "safe" [bezpecne volitelne] districts (up to 30 percent of votes), one in "relatively secure" [relativne volitelne] districts (30 to 35 percent of votes), and one or two in places that can only be won if there is an exceptional degree of success or if a significant number of preferential votes are used.

According to one delegate, who wished to remain anonymous, the ODS took basic steps to prepare for the key elections in 1992. "A common ticket can support only a few parties such as the KDS—only one more, I believe," were his exact words. The congress also noted the "nonaggression pact" between the ODS and the Civic Democratic Alliance. In working groups, the delegates discussed the main points of their election program, which they provisionally called "Ten Times Ten." In the section entitled, "The Law Abiding State," they foresee a union state composed of several members. Nevertheless, during the vote on approval of the working commissions' resolutions, the plenary meeting did not approve the passage about the union state and did not include it in the final text.

Vaclav Klaus was elected ODS chairman once again—327 votes out of a possible 344. The number of deputy chairmen was increased to four. In addition to Petr Cermak and Miroslav Macek, who are already known, Jiri Kovar and Jozef Zielenec were also elected.

[Bratislava VEREJNOST on 25 November on pages 1 and 2 carries the following 200-word CSTK report on Klaus' briefing after the congress entitled, "Vaclav Klaus on the ODS Strategy":

At a press conference after the ODS Congress, V. Klaus said that the dignified and peaceful course of the Plzen talks confirmed the chosen strategy of the party.

In his reply to one question, he said that anyone who had traced the development of the ODS since its constituent congress in Olomouc must have noticed that the radical wing is in a smaller minority than at that time. When asked the reason for his meeting with the Plzen Archdean on 23 November after lunch, he said that the ODS shares a very similar weltanschauung to Christians. He does not want to leave the Christian-oriented voters to those parties that contain the word "Christian" in their names. On the subject of possible cooperation with the Czechoslovak People's Party, he said that the policy of this party is unclear and ambiguous and that he does not consider the Czechoslovak People's Party a rightist party, despite the fact that this is what the party calls itself.]

Havel Tops Popularity Poll; Carnogursky Near Last

AU2811155191 Prague CSTK in English 1824 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 26 (CSTK)— Despite a loss of six percentage points, President Vaclav Havel continues to be Czechoslovakia's favorite politician, while Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky finds himself ranked number 20 out of 21, according to the latest opinion poll released today.

October 30-November 6, the Prague-based Institute for Public Opinion Research asked 1,360 people nationwide to indicate their support for 21 federal, Czech, and Slovak politicians.

After Havel followed Federal Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier of the center-left Civic Movement (OH), economist Valtr Komarek of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats (CSSD), Federal Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy of the right-wing Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and Federal Labor and Social Affairs Minister Petr Miller of the OH, in that order, among the population as a whole.

Among these five, Komarek, an outspoken critic of the Federal Government's economic reforms, showed the biggest increase since the last poll, gaining seven percentage points.

At the bottom of the ladder were former actor and Slovak External Relations Minister (August 1990-April 1991) Milan Knazko of the opposition Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Carnogursky of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), and Jozef Prokes, head of the Slovak National Party (SNS).

The popularity of Miroslav Sladek, leader of the Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC), who criticizes the current government as "crypto-communists" and calls for early elections, increased more than any other politician in the country, with an 11 percentage point gain.

Results of the poll in rank order with percentage of supporters in parentheses: .

	Nationwide	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic
Vaclav Havel	1 (71)	1 (81)	5 (49)
Jiri Dienstbier	2 (61)	2 (68)	7 (46)
Valtr Komarek	3 (60)	5 (57)	3 (65)
Vladimir Dlouhy	4 (58)	3 (58)	9 (38)
Petr Miller	5 (51)	6 (55)	8 (43)
Vaclav Klaus	6 (48)	4 (58)	16 (25)
Petr Pithart	7 (43)	7 (51)	14 (28)
Alexander Dubcek	8 (42)	13 (31)	2 (65)

	Nationwide	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic
Marian Calfa	9 (41)	8 (46)	11 (31)
Vladimir Meciar	10 (37)	17 (23)	1 (68)
Dagmar Buresova	11 (36)	9 (46)	21 (14)
Pavel Rychetsky	12 (34)	10 (36)	13 (30)
Peter Weiss	13 (31)	18 (17)	4 (59)
Lubos Dobrovsky	14 (31)	11 (35)	17 (23)
Frantisek Miklosko	15 (27)	14 (26)	15 (28)
Jozef Kucerak	16 (26)	12 (32)	20 (15)
Miroslav Sladek	17 (24)	16 (24)	18 (23)
Jan Langos	18 (23)	15 (25)	19 (21)
Milan Knazko	19 (19)	21 (06)	6 (46)
Jan Carnogursky	20 (17)	19 (11)	12 (30)
Jozef Prokes	21 (16)	20 (07)	10 (34)

Carnogursky on Husak's 'Greatness', Historic Role

AU2711091891 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 22 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by Marina Bednar; place and date not given: "Paradoxes of Family Fates"]

[Text] [Bednar] The general public has reacted to your decision to go, as a private person, to Gustav Husak's funeral. Could you give us your main reasons?

[Carnogursky] Since politics is a compromise between what we want and what is feasible, it contains contradictory elements that have a direct and contradictory impact on people. A simplified, black-and-white perception of politicians' actions cannot apply.

As far as Gustav Husak is concerned, he is one of the important personalities in Slovak history. Thinking along rightist lines—influenced by individual figures—dominates Slovak history. Due to the fact that Gustav Husak was an important representative of the leftist stream in politics, the first reaction to him in Slovakia was, to a certain extent, one of rejection, because Husak's position was outside the basic stereotype of Slovak politics. I see this fact as one of the features of his greatness—not to mention the fact that the leftist stream in Slovak politics is just as legitimate as the rightist stream.

This is why nothing will prevent me from recognizing the greatness of the left, if its greatness reaches that of Gustav Husak. Indeed, he was one of the initiators of the Slovak National Uprising and, historically speaking, the absolute value of the uprising is great, despite the need to reexamine and reevaluate many facts. To my mind, Gustav Husak was one of those who tried to preserve the genuineness of Slovak politics, and it was thanks to him that Slovak Catholics could enter political life. As it happened, my father at that time also discussed this with him. Husak was also a member of the Corps of Commissioners—so, formally, he was, in a way, my predecessor in office. When he was accused of bourgeois nationalism, he showed a decisive toughness and strength that prevented his ever indulging in self-criticism. Here again, our recognition of certain absolute values helps us to perceive the value of a man. After 1968, he proved himself to be a man pursuing realpolitik, despite all the negative impact this had on our society. Here the absolute value in my assessment changes from positive to negative.

[Bednar] You have given a political and historical description of Gustav Husak. However, I would be interested in your purely human view....

[Carnogursky] Personally I have to say that Gustav Husak involved himself twice in the destiny of our family. When my father was arrested in 1945, Gustav Husak, as chairman of the Corps of Commissioners, gave the order for his release. In 1989, he granted an amnesty to me. These two facts alone should be sufficient for people to understand my decision....

[Bednar] You spoke about contradictions in history. Are you not afraid that, as a politician, you could find yourself amidst similar historical paradoxes arising independently from your activity?

[Carnogursky] This is a fact, but politics is interesting and downright thoroughly exciting....

[Bednar] You have not answered my question....

[Carnogursky] There is a simple answer: No. The appoeal of the politics compensates for the risk.

[Bednar] Yet, are you not afraid that you could find yourself in a historical continuum that would be uncomfortable for you?

[Carnogursky] I do not think about it very often—just sometimes. If someone has moral qualities that he believes in, then this possibility is minimal. If I lost politically, I would be willing to withdraw. And, if the majority thinks that I am wrong, let someone else try it.

[Bednar] Do you believe that this is the way a politician should think?

[Carnogursky] He even has to think like that. A politician who does not is embarking on a road full of fatal errors and will have to pay for them, sooner or later.

Ministry Official Views Foreign Trade Data

AU2911113391 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Nov 91 p 9

[Interview with Josef Pancir, deputy federal foreign trade minister, by unidentified HOSPODARSKE NOVINY correspondent; place and date not given: "Exports Better Than Expected"]

[Excerpts] [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] To what extent is foreign trade a part of Czechoslovakia's economic problems?

[Pancir] Anyone who explains the economic difficulties by our foreign trade does not respect the reality shown by the data for the first three-quarters of the year. While production dropped by approximately 18 percent in comparison with the same period of 1990, exports declined by only 10.7 percent. This year we have exported to the market economies, including the third world, 5.8 percent more than in the comparable period last year. The exports to the EC mark an increase of as much as 17 percent, and to all developed market economies, 9.5 percent. Of course, exports to the Soviet Union are this year only about 62 percent [of last year's values], and exports to all former CEMA countries declined by 30.9 percent in comparison with the same period last year.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] What were imports like?

[Pancir] Imports declined in the first three-quarters of the year by 20.4 percent in comparison to last year. Only the imports from the third world countries grew, in fact, by 30.3 percent. The imports from the developed market economies declined by 19.8 percent, and from the former CEMA countries by 20.2 percent.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Is this development in foreign trade to be considered a negative phenomenon?

[Pancir] No, the opposite. It is a positive trend that we are beginning to import from the third world countries the raw materials we used to purchase from CEMA, and we are thereby creating conditions there for our exports, particularly in the sphere of engineering. In fact, in the third quarter we have completely turned the trade balance around. While in the first quarter of 1991, the total trade balance was 10 billion korunas in the red, the trade balance for the period of January-September is 10 billion korunas in the black. Hence, we exported 20 billion korunas worth of goods more than we imported in the third quarter.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The decline in imports cannot, however, be considered a positive sign in the economic trend.

[Pancir] If the imports provide all raw material, semifinished products, and technology needed for the economy, then the decline in imports is not necessarily a negative phenomenon. In 1990, machines formed 37.3 percent of the total imports, in the first to third quarters of 1991, of total imports to the value of 211 billion korunas, engineering accounted for 57 billion korunas.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] That, of course, is only 27 percent, so the trend really is negative.

[Pancir] Indeed, one has to take into consideration the territorial distribution of the engineering imports. Of the imports from the developed market economies (99 billion korunas), for instance, the engineering share forms almost a half. I would like to say that machine imports, as a whole, declined in absolute terms, but that what really declined was the import of machines bought according to the plan from the CEMA countries, which often did not meet the European standards. [passage omitted]

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Do you believe that we have a chance to increase Czechoslovak engineering exports to the developed markets?

[Pancir] We do, but we must change the structure of the engineering production fast, so that it corresponds better to market demand. The export of machines and technology made up approximately 20.3 percent of total exports to the market economies in 1990. In the first to third quarters of 1991, machines represented 29.1 billion korunas of the total exports to the market economy valued at 134 billion korunas. Hence, the proportion of machines in imports to the market economies is not declining but rather increasing moderately. [passage omitted]

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] What trend in foreign trade do you envisage for 1992?

[Pancir] We expect that the missing 10 percent recorded in exports for the first three quarters will be reduced in the last quarter. The total volume of exports should not be less than 92 to 93 percent of the 1990 level. Of course, there will be substantial territorial differences: Exports to the market economies will grow significantly, while exports to the former CEMA countries will decline. We expect that because of privatization and the contacts already established, foreign trade should liven up in 1992. It is difficult to estimate the size of the growth at this time, but we need the highest possible increase so as not to remain even farther behind the countries where the per capita exports are much higher than in Czechoslovakia and demonstrate the strength of their economy.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] How does Czechoslovakia compare?

[Pancir] In 1990, per capita foreign trade was worth $1,596 in Czechoslovakia, while in Austria, for instance, it was $11,919, in Denmark $12,976, in Canada $9,177, and in the Germany $11,878. In Poland, however, it amounted to only $568, and in Hungary to $1,751.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Does the situation in foreign trade correspond to the Federal Government expectations at the time it began the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy?

[Pancir] I would say that, particularly in exports, it is better than expected. Nobody expected that in 1991, with the anticipated drop in sales to East European countries, we could maintain exports above 90 percent of the 1990 values.

Jeszenszky: SFRY Disintegration 'Inevitable'

LD2711223291 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Geza Jeszenszky finds Yugoslavia's disintegration inevitable and believes that, before recognizing Slovenia and Croatia, the international community should concentrate on creating peace. The foreign minister said this in Lisbon after his talks with his Portuguese counterpart. In his statement, he called Serbia an aggressor and stressed that world opinion must not recognize the forceful changing of the borders. The politician stressed that in Budapest it is assumed that the six former Yugoslav republics will recognize the advantages of economic cooperation.

Defense Official Denies Interference in SFRY

LD2911072591 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0605 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Our guests in the studio are Dr. Ernoe Raffay, political state secretary for the Ministry of Defense, and international lawyer Thomas Kende. We will be discussing Yugoslavia. Mr. State Secretary, here is a question addressed to you. The question says: It was noted, or there was some reference made yesterday in the late night news reel, that an attack can be expected from the direction of Hungary—if I am reading this note correctly.

[Unidentified reporter] A Chetnik leader, a member of the militia, made this statement if I remember correctly.

[Raffay] These Chetniks have some most original proclamations in connection with Hungary. I have to contradict this news. I am familiar with our actions, and they are exclusively of a defensive nature. For some nine months in Yugoslavia, in Serbia, the Belgrade dailies have continuously quoted Chetnik leaders, according to whom some 60, 80, or 90 agricultural machines transported weapons from Hungary, some 60 or 70 people were shot—this is not true; an attack is expected—not true; we sent over saboteurs [words indistinct] in underground tunnels—not true. The military steps taken by our side have been absolutely correct. We do not any kind of attack against Yugoslavia either today or in the future. [sentence as heard] [passage omitted]

Antall Discusses Danube Dam, Christian Democracy

AU2711155391 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 25 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by Gyula L. Ortutay in Rome on 23 November: "Antall on the Recognition of the Six Republics"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] What issues did you discuss during your negotiations with the Slovak prime minister?

[Antall] We discussed the issue of the [Bos] power station; we are not getting anywhere on this issue. Jan Carnogursky will come to Budapest with the authorization of the Federal Government to continue the negotiations. They are definitely in favor of continuing the construction. On the other hand, there is a possibility of examining the whole issue by involving international experts. I again emphasized the international legal implications, namely that both peace treaties determined the border as the middle line of the main stream of the navigable Danube. In our view, in spite of the cooperation agreement on the power station signed by the former Hungarian Government, this cannot authorize Slovakia to make a unilateral step and, in fact, change the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border by diverting the water into a canal.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Would this mean that we are ready to take this issue even to the International Court in The Hague?

[Antall] That is possible. If we cannot come to an agreement, then we have to go to every possible forum and take every possible road.

We understand clearly that, in addition to rational considerations, there is also an emotional factor, and that is that the CSFR invested large sums in the power station, whereas Hungary invested less. Emotionally, the power station has become a national symbol for Slovakia. However, there are moral arguments to support our view, too. During the previous regime in Hungary, protest based on environmental considerations gained political meaning because it fitted into the system of symbols that represented the opposition's demonstration against the whole regime by protesting the power station and the so-called large-scale socialist investments. In addition, we also have the Hungarian National Assembly's decision obliging the government to negotiate on the termination of the power plant.

I repeat that there are professional considerations, and emotional and political connections, and we must be able to discuss all these issues openly and honestly.

Responding to a question of UJ MAGYARORSZAG on what kind of thoughts emerged following the Christian Democratic Forum, Jozsef Antall noted: "The Catholic Church cannot help but notice a lack of solidarity and an indifference in the developed industrial societies, but the first Slav pope calls us to fight against becoming too comfortable in a consumer society. We cannot talk about a welfare society in Eastern-Central Europe. The need for a low level but broad social security has been inherited from the former communist regime. Today this appears in the form that it was possible to buy bread in Stalin's time and work opportunities were ensured in Kadar's time and, in fact, it was possible to considerably improve living standards by doing extra work at weekends. However, this view was detached from economic realities, and a distorted and false feeling of solidarity prevailed when, having a paternalistic view, everyone

expected the state to solve their problems. Former communists unscrupulously use these problems to criticize the new government and to make the new system account for welfare. As if they did not exactly know that the collapse of the previous political regime and the handing over of the power was connected with the very fact that it was not able to provide democracy and material well-being. It is outrageous that they present the recession as necessarily following the changes, as if the government had deceived the country." Antall said that Central-Eastern Europe was in a particular position, because secularization took place at such a time and to such an extent that the Christian democratic movements were never really able to take up the representation of workers and employees.

According to Antall, social democratic parties, and indeed anything connected with Marxism or socialism, have lost ground in this region. As a result, a broad group of employees are covered by neither the Christian-social nor the social-democratic side. This is why it is justified to talk about the crisis of interest representation that is definitely not an advantageous thing.

Bush Writes Antall on NATO, SFRY Issues

LD2811233691 Budapest MTI in English 2056 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, November 28 (MTI)—US President George Bush has sent a letter to Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in which he assesses the achievements of the Rome summit of NATO, cooperation between the USA and Europe, and the topics of his discussion with Antall in the White House in September.

Bush says that a new chapter has begun in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance in which a new strategic conception will be enforced. Nevertheless, NATO will maintain its key role in guaranteeing security and stability in Europe. Taking also Hungary's endeavours and desires in view, NATO decided to set up a North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which will more efficiently integrate the new democracies—the new friends of the United States—into the community of Western institutions.

Bush goes on to emphasize that the US will maintain its presence in Europe and that the security of America is inseparable from that of Europe. In addition to the defence forces of the integrating Europe and the strengthening CSCE, NATO will remain the cornerstone of security and stability in the new Europe.

The talks in The Hague, Bush says, were also aimed at promoting the integration of the US economy into the global commercial system, which is a political and national security issue as well.

The President shares Hungary's concerns about the armed conflict in Yugoslavia, adding that the Yugoslavian federal military authorities and the Serbian Government have been informed about his standpoint.

Bush's message concerning Yugoslavia was complemented by a November 21 State Department statement, in which it welcomed the establishment of a neutral air corridor along the Hungarian-Yugoslavian border. In the middle of November, the US expressed its grave concern to the leaders of Yugoslavia, Serbia and the Yugoslavian People's Army over the military activities carried out in the vicinity of the Hungarian border and the repeated violation of Hungary's air space by Yugoslavian aircraft.

The US Government also informed the Hungarian Government and the sides concerned that it regarded the self-constraint Hungary displayed in handling the air space violations, the bombing of Barcs and the military maneouvres carried out near the border as exemplary for the whole region.

USSR Oil Supplies Considered 'Adequate'

AU2911140491 Budapest MTI in English 1752 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, November 27 (MTI)—Oil delivery from the Soviet Union to Hungary continues to go free from hitches, leaving Hungary with an adequate oil supply. However it is uncertain whether there will be sufficient oil for the first quarter of next year, Hungarian Oil Co. (HOC) officals told newsmen today.

In November, half a million tonnes of Soviet oil were imported through the Friendship pipeline and a similar amount is expected next month. HOC hopes the Adriatic pipeline between the Adriatic Sea and Hungary, closed because of the Yugoslav civil, may be reopened. The company, however, is prepared to procure oil through other channels.

Hungary's crude oil reserves are sufficient for two weeks and refined products for 40 days. From 1 January 1992 the maximum lead content of 92-octane and 98-octane petrols will be 0.15 gram/litre, conforming to European standards. (A year ago, the maximum lead content was three times as high.) Sulphuric content will be maximized at 0.05 percent.

In another development to combat air pollution, petrol stations in Budapest and vicinity are to start selling 91-octane, lead-free "city-petrol" next year.

Free Democrat Leader on Party Tasks, Prospects

AU2611164091 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Nov 91 p 9

[Interview with Imre Mecs, member of the leadership of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Balazs Stepan; place and date not given: "We Need the Creation of An Internal Coalition"]

[Excerpts] Alajos Dornbach and Peter Tolgyessy recently expressed their views on the future of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and what they regard as indispensable to the renewal of the activity of the SZDSZ and its faction in the National Assembly.

According to Imre Mecs, an organizational arrangement that reflects the party's configuration and an internal coalition between the various wings within the party are the conditions for progress: [passage omitted]

[Stepan] In your experience, what are the membership and the general public expecting from the SZDSZ today?

[Mecs] The people are primarily seeking an answer to their economic problems, and they hope that politics will dissolve the old economic structure and create a new one. At the same time, most people do not differentiate between the government coalition and the opposition and confuse the roles, from the viewpoint of obligations and responsibility. On the one hand, the SZDSZ should have a firm and clear-cut character; on the other hand, we should begin a dialogue with the public in order for them to accept our demands. We must work out a pragmatic economic policy program and expand the current single-level communication. At present, we have deep and very good relations with the scientific world, but our relations with the other political forces are less direct. In my opinion, our relations with the general public are very weak. I think that the National Assembly, the government, and the local self-governing bodies are sitting on the tip of an iceberg that is a featureless society spreading under them. One of the greatest crimes of the Kadar era is that we inherited a disintegrated, isolated, and passive society. It is now clear that a change in the political regime is a necessary but insufficient condition of progress. Today it is the task of the SZDSZ, as well as of all the other parties, to contribute to a new social structure and to the process of self-liberation. We must find the way that leads to social dialogue, and the country should not feel that the self-centered cooperation of a government and political elite is taking place above its head.

[Stepan] The SZDSZ is in a rather contradictory situation today because it has taken upon itself the role of a constructive opposition, while it also has to provide an alternative....

[Mecs] The most important opposition task, the role of supervision, is added to those other two tasks. According to the requirements of a system of political rotation, the SZDSZ is preparing for a government role, while it also fulfills its role as constructive opposition. This means that, in a given situation, it transfers ideas and concepts to the government, because the interests of the community demand this.

[Stepan] With whom could you cooperate closely in the National Assembly?

[Mecs] I oppose the large coalition, but I would not exclude this possibility in a national emergency. Naturally, this would only be possible for a limited period and according to well-determined principles. One should be careful, however, because it is difficult to emerge from a big coalition in a way to also be able to win an election. The SZDSZ carried out the bulk of the work at the opposition roundtable, but this did not show outside. A large coalition is also facing this danger.... A large coalition also threatens us with the possible forced acceptance of responsibility for a decision that did not entirely depend on us. We tried a coalition with the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] in the local self-governing bodies, and this was not easy at all. The time has not yet come for coalition cooperation with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], because this party has not yet transformed into a real "multiparty party." Joint votes occur, but we cannot yet talk about a coalition. We can envisage cooperation with the Christian Democrats, if they accept the concept of a minimum level of liberalism. In its current form, the Smallholders' Party cannot be regarded as ripe because its internal crisis and tensions are increasing, and it has not yet found its place. Personal conflicts and internal power struggles are weakening this party, while it is striving to represent hypothetical interests. Naturally, we could find a common language with a real agrarian party. In my view, we must maintain a dialogue with every parliamentary party, and cooperation is also possible. [passage omitted]

[Stepan] How do you see the relations between the party and its faction?

[Mecs] We must strengthen our party's organization and make the roles clear. With the exception of Janos Kis, all the party leaders are now members of the party faction and, therefore, this is a common leadership. I think, however, that the ideas of the various party wings should also be represented in the leadership. [passage omitted]

[Stepan] What are the essential values that the SZDSZ should maintain?

[Mecs] Respect for freedom, tolerance, and the protection of elementary human rights. I also regard the internal coalition as something fundamentally important. I do not agree with the idea of discarding any stratum of our party membership. On the contrary: I think the future lies in the broadening of this membership basis. We must firmly represent the workers and the people living from wages and salaries, and we must satisfy our social liberal features.

FIDESZ Opposes 'Justice Retribution Plan'

AU2711131591 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 25 Nov 91 p 9

[Interview with Viktor Orban, parliamentary faction leader of the Federation of Young Democrats, FIDESZ, by Attila Fekete; place and date not given: "FIDESZ Before Transformation?—Viktor Orban: Governing Parties Have Made Justice Impossible"]

[Excerpts] Within a short period of time, the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] has voiced a categorical "no" during the debates on two very significant bills. The FIDESZ's negative behavior in relation to the planned 1996 world exhibition and the justice retribution plan [the Zetenyi-Takacs proposal to lift the statute

of limitations on crimes committed under the communist regime] has made certain political circles suspect that the Young Democrats are actually making a show of their rejection to prove to the public that they are not about to occupy the coalition seat that will possibly be vacated by the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKgP]. Moreover, people suspect that the FIDESZ is using the crisis within the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] to consolidate its own position. We interviewed Viktor Orban on these issues, among others: [passage omitted]

[Fekete] FIDESZ members are not personally affected by the justice retribution plan, yet you were the ones who protested the most categorically against the Zetenyi-Takacs proposal. Who did you want to protect?

[Orban] Initially, there was a debate within our faction whether it would be wiser to say that this issue did not affect us, and then to lean back in our chairs and listen to the debate. However, all the parliamentary parties are responsible for the laws that are passed (in proportion to their number of mandates). We believe that the Zetenyi-Takacs proposal constitutes a serious infringement of the Constitution and that it violates certain international legal principles, so we could not sit there in silence. Furthermore, one has to realize that this is not at all a retribution of justice. This law is the same kind of Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] bluff as the world exhibition. Indeed, the real question is whether we can give justice without seriously infringing upon our state of law. [passage omitted]

[Fekete] Perhaps the only reason why the FIDESZ does not talk to the government the way it could is because it wants to keep the door open—so that it can join the coalition, should the FKgP leave.

[Orban] The FIDESZ's possible accession to the government is a favorite topic of conversation among intellectual circles in Budapest. However, the truth of the matter is that nobody has approached us on this issue, and the FIDESZ would not like to take part in such a weak government anyway. Nevertheless, we are not pleased about the conditions within the coalition. The events that are taking place in the FKgP only serve to further weaken the government.

[Fekete] Your potential ally, the SZDSZ, are also struggling with serious internal problems. With this knowledge in mind, do you believe that in two and a half years' time, the present opposition will be able to seize the power from the Antall government at the elections?

[Orban] We are not pleased about the situation that has developed in the SZDSZ, but I would like to make it clear right now that it is not in the FIDESZ's interest if the crisis in the SZDSZ is deepened or prolonged. The events that are taking place there are internal SZDSZ affairs, from every point of view. Nevertheless, I think that by the next elections, we can show that we are capable of drafting a better program and forming a better government than the present one. We have an increasing number of knowledgeable experts who could act as advisors and government members if need be.

[Fekete] Is the whole FIDESZ ready for governing?

[Orban] Many people are confused by the fact that the FIDESZ has never been a mass party, nor has it ever wanted to be. We think that we should prepare for the next elections as a modern electoral party. Look at the mass parties (the MDF or the SZDSZ): With their membership figures, they are now starting to qualify as electoral parties. We believe that if a year before the elections we have at least two candidates in every constituency and a few groups to do the campaigning, and if we take part in the local community life in all the larger districts, then—with the appropriate expert background—we will be able to succeed. [passage omitted]

5-Party Coalition Urges Nomination of Olszewski

LD2811213291 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1830 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] We have managed today to get hold of the letter from the representatives of the five parties [Center Alliance, Confederation for an Independent Poland, Christian National Union, Liberal Democratic Congress and Peasant Alliance] to President Lech Walesa. It reads:

Mr. President: During the last meeting between representatives of our five parties, you expressed a willingness to hold further talks concerning the nomination of the lawyer Jan Olszewski as prime minister, following the creation of an appropriate majority in the Sejm. We have the honor to inform you that such a majority exists. Stating our desire for the best possible cooperation with the president and maintaining our support for Jan Olszewski, we request that you nominate a candidate for prime minister as quickly as constitutionally possible.

The letter is signed by five representatives of the parties.

Discusses New Government Formation

LD2811190291 Warsaw PAP in English 1757 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 28—Representatives of the five coalition parties: Confederation for Independent Poland, Liberal-Democratic Congress, Centre Alliance, Peasant Alliance and the Christian National Union discussed here Thursday the formation of a government of experts having as stable a political basis as possible.

The concept of such a government was presented by the coalition's candidate for the office of prime minister, Jan Olszewski, who told newsmen after the meeting that this would certainly be a non-party government in which "ministerial post would not be distributed among the individual parties."

According to Olszewski the president has made clear his stand on the issue of government formation and wants legal regulations concerning the government and its relations with Parliament and president to precede any nominations.

Asked about his chances for undertaking the mission of government formation Olszewski replied that "It is known that under certain circumstances I would not be a likely candidate to undertake such a mission. Generally, I have never been regarded a hawk and I can hardly be expected to change my views that late in my life," he added.

Meanwhile Lech Walesa's press office confirmed Thursday morning that the president had received a letter from the coalition of five parties stressing their desire "to establish the best possible cooperation with the president." The authors of the letter also upheld their support for Olszewski as their candidate for premier and called on the president to designate the candidate as soon as possible, in constitutional terms.

In a conversation with journalists the Centre Alliance leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski has not excluded the possibility of broadening the centre-right coalition by admitting at least one more grouping. Kaczynski stressed that the five had not discussed this question but declared this "was an encouraging prospect from his point of view." He also added that "reaching agreement with the Democratic Union depended solely on that party's attitude".

Krzysztof Krol of the Confederation for Independent Poland disclosed that the coalition was conducting talks with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and stated that the five was able to prove that it can have a still greater majority in the Sejm.

Relations Between Walesa, Sejm Assessed

PM2811101391 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 22 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Henryk Gallus: "Walesa's Mistake and Center Left's Intransigence: Sejm and President in New Situation"]

[Text] Cooperation between President Lech Walesa and the newly elected Sejm has had an ill-starred beginning. This is patently evident from the fact that the president and the leaders of the main parliamentary caucuses have been talking at cross purposes regarding the candidate for prime minister and the composition of the government coalition, and also from the crisis that arose around these major concerns on the eve of the inaugural Sejm session scheduled for 25 November.

How did this crisis develop, and what are the chances of overcoming it?

There is no doubt that the main reason lies in the fact that the results of the parliamentary election were not as expected by the president and by the political groups aspiring to play the leading role in forging a democratic Poland and restructuring the state and its economy. Indeed, many doubts are still unresolved regarding the interpretation of the election results and their consequences for the eventual alignment of forces within the Sejm, especially against the background of the tremendous political fragmentation and the existence of highly complex political and economic problems in the country. A significant role is also played here by the lack of psychological inclination to carry out a realistic appraisal of the existing situation and to draw pragmatic conclusions from such an appraisal.

Clearly, the vision of a fragmented and consequently feeble Sejm has induced President Lech Walesa and his current circle of close advisers to hold on to the idea that the president should play a key role in the state and maintain a paternalistic attitude toward the Sejm—which may be democratic, but is nevertheless as fragmented as a complex mosaic and which, moreover, retains slight "communizing" influences. This is an analogy to Walesa's earlier attempts to play a "supervisory" role—albeit for different reasons—in relation to

the previous "contractual" Sejm, with its equally fragmented post-Solidarity groups.

This attitude on the part of Lech Walesa is shown by his original rejection of the Democratic Union initiative to form a government coalition and his subsequent proposals of several options regarding the composition of the government with the president in the role of super prime minister. Walesa's controlling ambitions are also evident from the way he forced the four parties closest to his own political stand (Liberal Democratic Congress, Center Alliance, Christian National Union, and Confederation for an Independent Poland) to affirm his ideas on such a government. As we know, these four groups were expected to hold talks at the Belvedere Palace one day "until they arrived at an agreement." The whole concept contained an in-built idea of reinforcing the executive power of the president and the government and preserving the position of Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and certain members of his government, which was, of course, originally appointed by the then newly elected president.

The refusal by the "Big Four" (or, rather the "Big Three," since the Liberal Democratic Congress avoided taking a clearly defined position throughout) to accept such a solution, and their proposal to form an independent coalition with their own candidate for prime minister, Jan Olszewski, was such a profound disappointment to Lech Walesa that he immediately changed his position in favor of the Democratic Union—which he had previously viewed with distinct antipathy—and, unexpectedly, officially entrusted Bronislaw Geremek with the mission of forming the government. However, this concept did not survive even a full week.

Having launched themselves into a very risky political game, the president and the Democratic Union failed to appreciate the determination of the leaders of the "Big Four"—which has since grown to include the Peasant Alliance and now constitutes a coalition of five center-right parties. The "Five" has proved highly cohesive. None of its members has moved over to the Democratic Union camp and, as a result, it could successfully block Bronislaw Geremek's mission and the countercoalition he was forming. In addition, it left the president no option but to acknowledge the center-left group as a significant force. In appointing a lower-ranking official at his chancellery to talk with its leaders, Lech Walesa showed such insulting disrespect for the group of parties that won the democratic election mandate from the population that it could now prove quite difficult to resume the cooperation initiative.

The outcome of this round in the game is that the Democratic Union effectively lost its chance to play a leading role in any new coalition agreements, while Lech Walesa will be unable to count on the support he needs for creating a pro-president coalition in the Sejm, unless he somehow withdraws from the conflict with the center right. On the other hand, the five center-right parties are now facing a virtually open way to function as an effective government majority in the Sejm—or even a constitutional majority—if they manage to persuade the now-desperate Democratic Union, or at least its right-wing faction, to cooperate with them on a broader platform.

In the first case, it would be possible to appoint and maintain, for at least some time, a center-right government with its own candidate as prime minister, whom the president would have no option but to accept since he must respect the rules of the democratic system. In the second case, on the other hand, the center-right group, in an alliance with the Democratic Union, stands a chance of securing the two-thirds of the votes necessary to change the Constitution. It is rather to be expected that the Democratic Union will be inclined to accept the latter arrangement, since it knows that in the other case it is more than likely that its place would be taken over by the Polish Peasant Party.

These are the real mechanisms and rules of play in a democratic Sejm, even one as highly fragmented as the present one. If none of the parties has won the majority in the Sejm election, then a majority can only be formed by way of agreement between two or more main parties. In the present Sejm, a government majority can only be reached if at least five parties join ranks, and a constitutional majority would require at least six or seven parties.

Despite the existence of great parliamentary fragmentation, the elites of the parties that form a coalition in the Sejm nurture an ambition to become a main center of state power and of all the initiatives concerning policy programs. President Lech Walesa clearly underestimated this natural inclination and expected to be able to keep firm control of the initiative, despite the fact that a democratically elected Sejm has now entered the public arena. Consequently, he will now either recognize and acknowledge the real implications of the situation or will become embroiled in a conflict yet again—but this time the conflict would be with a democratically elected Sejm, which could threaten destabilization or destruction of the state.

It is to be expected that already the inaugural session of the new Sejm, at which the Sejm administrative bodies will be formed and whose agenda includes the question of forming a new government in view of the anticipated resignation—already announced by the government spokesman—of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's government, will indicate the direction of future relations between the Sejm and the president. However, a future conflict in this area can be largely averted by the new Sejm's legislative decisions. Among other measures, the Sejm should clearly define—maybe in the form of a "small constitution"—the relation between the Sejm's and the president's powers, by guaranteeing the former the full extent of the legislative authority and the latter the executive authority that he should share with the government.

Economic Prospects, Priorities for 1992 Viewed

PM2911094191 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 22 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by Karol Rzemieniecki: "Are Things Going to Improve? Expected Changes in Economic Policy"]

[Text] In the stream of generalities about the necessary measures that must be taken to improve the economy, it is possible now and again to fish out the actual specific ventures that will in all probability be launched in the approaching year of 1992, regardless of who eventually heads the new government, the individual ministries, and the Polish National Bank. A list of these ventures can be compiled from—among other sources—the documents of the Central Planning Office [CUP], put together after several months of research and discussion by specialist working groups from this institution, several other government agencies, and academic research centers in Warsaw and other Polish cities. Halina Wasilewska, secretary of state at CUP, recently issued a communique on the progress of this work.

To give an example, we can soon expect to see a new institution, the State Treasury Agency, beginning operations at its parent office, as well as at a number of branch offices throughout the country. This new body will gradually take over from the so-called founding organizations the care of the national assets concentrated at enterprises that are still under state control and those that have already been privatized and in which the state will retain a controlling share. It is certain that during the coming year some forms of assistance will be extended to state enterprises, especially industrial enterprises in economic and financial difficulties.

This move has the approval of the majority of political groups today. Nor are there any protests against it from circles close to Vice Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. The question about which particular enterprises will receive this assistance can already be given an almost definite answer. It will be mainly the enterprises that have, without waiting for initiative to come from their parent agencies (that is, mainly ministries), already worked out their own restructuring programs and those that can boast significant export successes opening up foreign markets to Polish products and services. This assistance will, of course, be selective and not the same for all its recipients. It will entail, inter alia, tax and customs tariff allowances, favorable loan terms, and assistance in matters of organization and legislation. On the other hand, when it comes to state enterprises which do not show much hope for profitable operation, their inevitable liquidation in one way or another will, as a rule, be preceded by protective measures devised to help their employees and, first of all, by the provision of new jobs and training schemes that will facilitate the retraining of the workers who are losing their jobs. So far, these measures all too often remain in the sphere of theory and good intentions. However, we can expect that before very long local self-government agencies—which are the main intended recipients of these ventures—will be offered appropriately effective incentives from the central budget and the banks.

In 1992, we can expect to encounter more and more situations in which directors and board members of enterprises scheduled to be privatized will be allocated special share packages on preferential terms. Moreover, the process of privatization of industrial enterprises, banks, and other branches of the economy will be incorporated within the framework of a government plan—however good or bad—that has been dubbed a "privatization map" by the CUP researchers and that will have to take into account both the timetables and the order in which the sectors of the economy are to be privatized, and also the appropriate procedures, since there are at least several different ways to transform state assets into private assets. It is believed that work on such a "privatization map" is at an advanced stage.

According to CUP forecasters, 1992 will be a year in which the product structure of the national income in Poland will undergo further transformation, though the change will still be relatively insignificant, like that in 1991. This, of course, is the necessary condition for surmounting the crisis. This development will be linked to the bankruptcy of certain enterprises, a continued shrinking of output in the raw materials and capital investment (plant and equipment) sectors of the economy, a methodical and accelerating expansion of the private sector (even today, almost 2 million people are active in it), and a marked improvement in certain branches of the services sector (communications and domestic commerce).

If all these planned ventures are efficiently realized, it may be possible to check the current wave of recession that has been dogging us for more than two years now, as early as the second half of 1992.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Calls Off Visit

AU2911112491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1054 GMT 29 Nov 91

["Communique of Romanian Foreign Ministry"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/11/1991—The press officer of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that the visit to Romania of the foreign minister of the Ukraine no longer takes place today, November 29.

Parliament Declaration on Ukraine Referendum

AU2811134891 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1046 GMT 28 Nov 91

["Declaration of Romania's Parliament on the 1 December Referendum in the Ukraine" read by Senate Deputy President Vasile Mois at the joint session of the two chambers of Parliament to mark Romania's national day of 1 December—live]

[Text] Romania's Parliament, the Deputies' Assembly and the Senate, Declaration of Romania's Parliament on the 1 December Referendum in the Ukraine:

1. Romania's Parliament took note of the decision of Kiev authorities to organize on 1 December 1991 a referendum on the independence of the Republic of the Ukraine. Profoundly attached to the basic principles of the fundamental right and freedom of people and nations to decide their own destiny, Romania's Parliament welcomes the decision of the Kiev Ukrainian authorities to organize a referendum on the independence of the Republic of Ukraine. In view of the fact that this referendum is also scheduled to take place on the Romanian territories of north Bukovina, Herta district, Hodin district, and the counties in southern Bessarabia, Romania's Parliament solemnly declares that these territories were torn away from our country's body and that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was declared null and void ab initio by the USSR on 24 December 1989 and by Romania's Parliament on 24 June 1991.

Of course, it is the Ukraine's right to organize a referendum on its independence. However, this referendum cannot take place on Romanian territories abusively annexed by the former USSR, territories that have never belonged to the Ukraine and rightfully belong to Romania.

2. Romania's Parliament reiterates its attachment to the provisions of the Helsinki CSCE Final Act, which allows for the possibility of solving territorial differences through diplomatic means.

3. Romania's Parliament solemnly declares that the referendum organized by the Kiev authorities in the Romanian territories incorporated by force into the former USSR—that is north Bukovina, Herta district, Hodin district, and the counties in southern Bessarabia—and its consequences are null and void.

4. Romania's Parliament asks the parliaments and governments of all states that will recognize the Ukraine's independence to expressly declare that this recognition does not extend to the aforementioned Romanian territories.

5. Romania's Parliament calls for a dialogue with the Kiev Parliament and invites a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to pay a visit to Bucharest as soon as possible.

6. Romania's Parliament asks the country's government to immediately start negotiations with the Kiev authorities on the Romanian territories annexed by force to the USSR.

This declaration was adopted by Romania's Parliament at its 28 November 1991 session.

Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis Pays Visit

Stolojan on Bilateral Ties

NC2711214391 Athens ET-1 Television Network in Greek 1940 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Interview with Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded; in English with superimposed Greek translation]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister: These days you are holding important talks with your Greek counterpart, Konstandinos Mitsotakis. What is the main subject of your discussions?

[Stolojan] The first thing I would like to say to the Greek people is that we have had diplomatic relations since 1880, which means more than 111 years, with about a 10-year break after World War II. This shows that for a long time we have had and continue to maintain good diplomatic relations. As for the agenda of my talks with the Greek prime minister, these are naturally on political and economic issues, as well as on cultural topics, given the fact that the cultural relations between our countries are very intensive.

[Correspondent] What is the current state of affairs in Greek-Romanian relations?

[Stolojan] Concerning the economic side, I think that the most important point is our trade relations. In 1981, the level of imports-exports between our two countries reached $370 million. In 1991, this level has dropped to $147 million. So, I believe that probably the main goal in the trade sector is to restore the level of exchanges that existed in 1981. We also will discuss, of course, the various possibilities for cooperation between the two countries, given the well-known fact that Romania has a great potential for cooperation, as actually is the case with Greece. [passage omitted]

Cooperation also is possible in local transport and railways. We could offer electric power for transportation; moreover, we could contribute to constructing the subway in Greece and so forth.

[Correspondent] What, in your assessment, are the basic reasons behind the Balkans crisis? Is it the legacy of Stalinism, or is it probably that centuries-old national and religious differences are proving to be stronger?

[Stolojan] I believe there are many reasons for the clashes that have erupted. The break with Stalinism naturally plays a role. At the same time, there are the national clashes that during Stalinism were, let us say, suppressed and now, in a society based on democracy and a market economy—a true market economy—these clashes can break out freely. But there also are the foreign interests in this region that certainly are very strong. It is exactly because of these foreign interests that it is not easy to achieve peace. Of course, there also is the EC, which has placed some economic restrictions on Yugoslavia. I do not know whether these measures will bring peace to Yugoslavia, but they certainly will lower the Yugoslav people's standard of living. This certainly will be the result of these economic restrictions.

[Correspondent] What are the main goals of Romanian foreign policy in the Balkans and elsewhere?

[Stolojan] For the time being, we are in a transitional period, and we are working to build and strengthen democracy in Romania, as well as to expedite economic reforms. At the same time, we are trying to gain entry into international European organizations such as the EC and so forth. Our efforts in the diplomatic field serve precisely these goals.

[Correspondent] Are you satisfied with the reforms that have been made thus far in the political sector, as well as in the direction of a free-market economy?

[Stolojan] If you look at the course the reforms have taken, the success that both the economic and political reforms have achieved, then we cannot say we are disappointed with this course. The Romanian people have managed in less than two years to combine many reforms with democracy. But if we look at the matter from the aspect of the Romanian people's standard of living, then we are not satisfied. Why is that? Because the standard of living has fallen and continues to fall. [passage omitted]

Stolojan, Mitsotakis Give Briefing

AU2811124591

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0954 GMT on 28 November 1991 begins a live relay from the government headquarters at Bucharest's Victoria Palace of a news conference given by Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis and Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan on the occasion of Mitsotakis' official visit to Romania. The news conference begins with introductory statements by the two prime ministers.

In his introductory statement, Prime Minister Mitsotakis, who speaks in Greek with simultaneous translation into Romanian, expresses "satisfaction with the results" of the visit to Bucharest and expresses thanks for "the warmth with which we were welcomed in Bucharest."

He continues by stressing that "Romania has firmly embarked on the road to democracy and the road to the market economy. Of course, it is facing a number of difficulties, but I am sure that it will overcome them." Mitsotakis then reviews "our traditional relations, which are very positive in all areas," and stresses that his visit to Romania "constitutes a new beginning in our relations." He goes on to say that "the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness that we signed today constitutes the legal framework for further developing these relations."

After discussing the talks held in Romania, Mitsotakis says that they "covered all areas—political, economic, and cultural." He stresses that both sides expressed the "desire to continue, to advance in developing these relations," because there are "possibilities" in this respect. After saying that he was pleased to address the Romanian Parliament and meet with Romanian church dignitaries, Mitsotakis concludes his statement by saying that "I want to assure the Romanian people that the Greek Government and people are at their side during these times," and that the Romanian people "may view us as good friends." He ends by wishing the Romanian people "a better future and a more prosperous tomorrow."

In his introductory statement, Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan first thanks Mitsotakis and then says: "We are honored by the visit you are paying to our country. We believe that this meeting that we began yesterday represents a natural continuation of the new links, the new relations that were established and intensified in the wake of the December 1989 revolution, Greece being the first to recognize the government set up immediately after the December revolution in Romania."

He continues by saying, "We will not stop at this point in our relations. During the meeting we held we examined" prospects for "developing these relations in the future, both at the political, economic, and cultural levels." The "meeting between the presidents of the two countries is being prepared," and "there will be meetings between our ministers in charge of various areas." After reviewing the protocols and accords signed with the aim of "creating conditions for developing relations of cooperation between our countries, including this foundation, so to say, which is called the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness," Stolojan emphasizes that, "The results are positive for both countries" and that the "prime minister informed us" about Greece's desire "to support the efforts made by

Romania today, including by opening a credit line for imports from Greece." He then emphasizes that what is "maybe even more important is this friendly attitude" by Greece "toward Romania, this sincere affirmation of the desire to support Romania in overcoming its difficulties, and the really keen interest of the Greek businessmen with whom I met yesterday afternoon, in coming to Romania and in doing business that is profitable for both sides."

Stolojan goes to say, "What we were able to note together" was "a common basis of understanding of both the political and economic phenomena. And this common basis is Romania's clear cut embarkment on the road to democracy and the market economy. This is the basis for revitalizing the dialogue with Greece and, in fact, the dialogue with other Balkan countries" as well as "the dialogue for Romania's development and entry, so to say, into the international world, the European world, and the Balkan world." He says that the question of what action can be taken "to shorten this road as much as possible for Romania" was also discussed.

Prime Minister Stolojan concludes his introductory statement by saying, "We have noted with satisfaction that there is no problem—among the ones we have discussed—on which the two sides do not have almost the same view, because there is this basis of approaching things that are common to us. I want to express thanks, Mr. Prime Minister. Once again I express my satisfaction with your visit to Romania and with the fruitful results of the visit. And through you I want to express thanks to the Greek people, who are at our side and wish to be at our side in this world. Thank you."

At 1006 GMT, the question-and-answer session begins with Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis noting that the two countries' positions "coincide" on the issue of cooperation in the Balkans. Answering a question about the situation in Yugoslavia, Stolojan says that "Romania supports any initiative that can bring peace to Yugoslavia, primarily UN initiatives, any UN initiative." He reiterates that "Romania has absolutely no territorial or other claims on Yugoslavia." However, "Romania has major economic interests, a major interest in relations with Yugoslavia. The interruption of the ties with that country, for whatever reasons, would be a very hard blow for Romania at this stage." Therefore, "we hope that no embargo will be imposed on economic relations with Yugoslavia and the component republics. In practical terms, Romania, as part of the international community, will observe all commitments deriving from that quality; however, one should take this nuance into consideration."

Asked about his promise to "shorten Romania's way to Europe," Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis says that, aside from "economic assistance," Greece is also prepared to help Romania on its "road to true democracy," which will "draw it closer to Europe." Referring to the situation in Yugoslavia, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis says that Greece "would first like to see an end to military clashes there and the start of negotiations for a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis." He adds that "Greece favors the maintenance of Yugoslavia's unity, within a federation or confederation, with broad freedoms for the component republics. Any other solution would entail great problems." In answer to another question, Mitsotakis reiterates "Greece's desire to further develop its ties with the countries in eastern Europe" and to support Romania in its relations with the EC. Regarding Greece's relationship with Turkey, Mitsotakis says that "unfortunately, the ties have not yet improved," but that further efforts are necessary to "solve the Cyprus crisis."

At this point, Stolojan reiterates Romania's "good relations with both Turkey and Greece" and expresses the hope that the Cyprus problem will be solved "through negotiations." Answering another question about a "joint Romanian-Greek initiative" with regard to Yugoslavia, Mitsotakis says, "We do not believe this is the right time for us to assume a broader initiative in the Yugoslav problem." Stolojan says that "the Romanian Government's basic position is that the solution of the Yugoslav problem should come from within Yugoslavia, that would be the best possible way." He adds that "the Romanian Government has expressed its readiness to contribute, if asked, to promoting the peace process in Yugoslavia. In this respect, the Romanian prime minister adds that "Romania does not believe that European troops should participate in solving the Yugoslav problem. I believe that there is the United Nations, which has dealt with similar problems in many parts of the world and, if that is deemed to be the necessary solution, it can also do it in Yugoslavia. In Europe, there are currently countries with very definite interests vis-a-vis a certain evolution of the Yugoslav situation."

Answering a question whether "Romania intends to ask to join NATO," Stolojan says: "It seem that there is no procedure for such a thing as yet. However, we have contacts with NATO. Therefore, if such a procedure is established, we will examine it and see what has to be done. Anyhow, as you could see for yourselves, even yesterday the Romanian defense minister returned [from Brussels], where he had meetings at NATO headquarters."

The news conference at Victoria Palace ends at 1042 GMT.

Friendship Treaty Signed

AU2811144591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1331 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 28/11/1991—A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Greece and Romania was signed in Bucharest today in the presence of the president of Romania and of the prime ministers of Romania and Greece.

In his brief address on the occasion, Romanian Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan said: "We hope this accord will be the starting point for more intense relations on all—political, economic and cultural—planes, that the links between our two countries will enrich and that the present low level of our economic ties, which corresponds neither to the two countries' potential nor to our natural wishes, will be left behind."

In his turn, Premier Mitsotakis said: "I am very happy we signed this friendship treaty today. It is an essence of our talks in Bucharest. There are great possibilities to develop our bilateral ties in all areas also considering the traditional links between our two peoples. Recent developments in Romania, the deeply democratic changes wrought here and the country's firm advance to the market economy further encourage the expansion of the relations between Greece and Romania. Greece is determined to help friendly Romania to successfully attain all its targets."

In his address, President Ion Iliescu said: "First of all I should like to once again welcome you to Romania and to the Romanian capital city, Bucharest, and to express my satisfaction at the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between our two countries. It so happens that the treaty with Greece is signed at a highly significant moment in the political life of Romania—the adoption by Romania's Parliament of the new Constitution of the country and the preparation of the people's referendum, which will express a constitutional principle, the people's vote for the country's fundamental law. This moment is significant because it reflects the deep-going, ineluctable and irreversible changes wrought in the political, economic and social life of the country. It probably is the most significant moment after the December revolution marking the end of a process and the opening of a new phase in the country's democratic development. These changes also bespeak a new orientation in Romania's foreign policy, its openness to the world and to Europe, the efforts to improve and consolidate amiable relations with friendly neighbouring countries. Our links with Greece are rooted in history. The spirit of friendship and solidarity, which has been consolidated between our two peoples in time, is also a salient feature of the treaty you signed today."

ROMPRES Details Joint Treaty

AU2911081891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1916 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/11/1991—A twenty-year-long treaty of friendship, cooperation and good neighborhood between Romania and the Hellenic Republic was signed in Bucharest on November 28.

Specifying that the treaty "affects in no way the rights and obligations deriving from the agreements and conventions in force concluded by the signatory countries with other states" and that "it is directed in no way against a third party," the document stresses, among other things, that "Romania and the Hellenic Republic shall develop their relations on the basis of confidence, collaboration and mutual respect."

While taking concerted action for turning Europe into a community of states, the two countries are determined to help consolidate the state of law and accomplish fundamental human rights and liberties as part of the procedures set under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The two parties also reiterate the inadmissibility of using force or the threat of force in international relations, and advocate peaceful settlement of international issues, whole committing themselves to backing the implementation of the collective security building measures stipulated by Chapter 7 in the United Nations Charter. Romania and Greece shall work for the promotion of balanced troops and arms reduction, and shall cooperate for the achievement of disarmament under rigorous and efficient international control.

Inspired by the traditions of collaboration and cultural communication between the Greek and Romanian peoples, the treaty has in view the two parties' encouragement of contacts between universities, research centers as well as the initiatives in developing audiovisual means, dramaturgy, music and plastic arts.

The parties commit themselves to broadening and boosting economic, industrial, technological, scientific and ecologic collaboration. The treaty also underscores the leading role the European communities can play in implementing the programme for economic reforms in Romania.

A major role in strengthening the Romanian-Hellenic collaboration is to be played by the Joint Inter-Governmental Commissions for Economic, Technological and Scientific Collaboration. Along this line the treaty stipulates that the parties shall stimulate direct capital investment, the creation of joint commercial companies, including the partners' participation in third countries. The treaty also specifies that the parties shall attach priority importance to collaboration in energy, transport and telecommunications, all while favoring their cooperation in science, top technology, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes included.

Given the global significance of environmental protection, the parties intend to promote their collaboration in this field in accordance with a long-ranging programme to be set under an appropriate bilateral convention. They shall also give special attention to environmental protection in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

The parties shall expand their collaboration in the juridical and consular spheres, and shall improve the legal framework of their bilateral ties in accordance with the development stages in the economic, social and juridical structures.

The treaty also mentions that, given the special role of orthodoxy in the spiritual advancement of the two peoples, the contracting parties shall facilitate contacts between the two churches.

Iliescu Considers Himself 'Independent'

AU2911135191 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 17 Nov 91 p 1

[Corina Cretu report on interview with President Ion Iliescu: "Mr. Ion Iliescu: 'I Have the Status of an Independent'"]

[Text] After the Monday, 25 November, meeting with the leaders of political parties, President Ion Iliescu was simply assaulted by journalists, in spite of the fact that he was scheduled to give a news conference the following day. Cornered by reporters from AZI and VIITORUL ROMANESC [ROMANIAN FUTURE], Mr. Ion Iliescu—aside from several protocol statements about the recently concluded meeting—shared with us some thoughts about the future presidential elections:

[VIITORUL ROMANESC] Will you run in the next elections?

[Iliescu] It is too early to talk about that.

[VIITORUL ROMANESC] If you run, will you run as an independent or supported by the National Salvation Front [FSN]?

[Iliescu] Again, it is too early...

[VIITORUL ROMANESC] Along the way, there may crop up...

[Iliescu] Of course, I have the status of an independent and, if I run—that was your first question—I will see in what form I do it.

[VIITORUL ROMANESC] Could there be counter-candidates from the Front?

[Iliescu] Why not? Each grouping may appoint its own candidate, may support a previous candidate or another one.... It is the option of each grouping. Anyway, it is hard to say....

[AZI] If the Front advances your proposal, will you accept it?

[Iliescu] Again, it is too soon to say. Probably yes, given our links....

[AZI] Because of political or sentimental reasons?

[Iliescu] Both from rational, sentimental, and whatever reasons you like....

UDMR Holds Session on Referendum in Cluj

LD2711064491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] The Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] held a national session in Cluj. Tibor Bogdan reports:

[Bogdan] The Hungarians of Romania should fulfill their duty as citizens, that is to say, they should thoroughly study the new Constitution and should take part in the referendum called for the on 8 December to sanction it, and this time they should vote according to their discretion and conscience. This is the suggestion of the RMDSZ Presidium, which was expressed in a statement issued on the national session in Cluj.

The members of the body, who call themselves Szeklerland—the political group of the RMDSZ—and who wish to organize a referendum on the issue of autonomy of Szeklerland on the occasion of commemorations at Lutita, also took part in the meeting. The proposal stirred up a great storm at that time among the Romanian extremists, and it contributed to the fact that the faction, eventually, had dissolved itself.

The Presidium has thoroughly examined the activity of this group and its political consequences and has taken notice of the fact that the body has ceased its activity. At the same time it condemned slanderous, unfounded attacks against the members of the Federation, first of all against its honorary chairman, Laszlo Tokes.

On the recently published Nationality Declaration by the government, the statement issued on the session calls attention to the fact that the representative organ of the Magyardom considers the document very significant and will soon make its standpoint on the matter public.

International

Romania Offers To Serve as Conflict Mediator

92BA0156A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Nov 91 p 17

[Article by M. Petrovic: "Bucharest Offers To Act as an Intermediary"]

[Text] Bucharest—From the very outset of the Yugocrisis, the exceptionally objective stance of Romania toward it has been seen as the only valid and promising possibility for resolving it. By contrast with many others—especially neighboring countries, Romania has consistently said and still says that this solution can come only from within, without interference of external powers, and through reasonable negotiations. That position was confirmed once again during the visit to Bucharest of two distinguished figures from Yugoslavia: Borisav Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency, who talked with Romanian President Ion Iliescu, and Dragutin Zelenovic, Serbian prime minister, who talked with Prime Minister Teodor Stolozan.

As for the Romanian-Serb talks on Saturday at the level of prime ministers, they have already been a topic of comment, consideration, and much attention in the coverage which the mass media here has paid to this event.

The four-hour talks between Zelenovic and Stolozan (also attended by the foreign ministers) were said to be very frank, friendly, and to the point. The conclusion was drawn that there exist ramified bilateral relations and opportunities for their further development in the political, economic, and cultural domains. But even something more than that.

Above all, we should emphasize the words of Prime Minister Stolozan, who said: "I have noted with satisfaction the sincere desire of Serbia to halt the armed conflicts." He then added: "In a way, Romania has a special approach to the situation in Yugoslavia. We are neighbors with Yugoslavia, with Serbia, and there is no reason for any dispute between us. There are no sources of tension whatsoever between us and any of the Yugoslav republics. That is why Romania can contribute to halting the armed conflicts and stimulating the peace process."

Observers here gave considerable coverage to the offer of Prime Minister Stolozan, who said that "Romania is ready if it should be called upon to talk with any of the republics in Yugoslavia in order to contribute to the peace process." The Romanian prime minister had a moral basis for saying this, because from the beginning his government has worked to maintain an equal distance between it and all the Yugoslav governmental entities (we recall that Bucharest was recently visited by government representatives of Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia).

Nevertheless, it is believed that the points of the Romanian position most taken note of during the talks between Zelenovic and Stolozan were the explicit statements that support was being given to initiatives which could contribute to calm, especially those of the United Nations (that is, the "blue helmets"), and that the economic and other sanctions are unproductive, that they can only worsen the position of the population and do not resolve armed conflicts at all.

The Serbian prime minister, Zelenovic, expressed satisfaction with the "talks in friendly Romania, with which, fortunately, we have a lengthy border." It was his judgment that the Serbian position "had encountered full understanding on the Romanian side within the limits which are possible today in Europe and between our two countries."

When asked by our correspondent what impressions he had received concerning the evolution of the Yugocrisis in recent weeks during his numerous contacts all over the world, Nastase, head of the Romanian foreign service, expressed the opinion that "a moment of negative energy has been exhausted in Yugoslavia, and now elements counterproductive for all countries are emerging. Which means that the crisis has reached its maximum level and that things are moving toward a cease-fire, which will make political talks possible. What we favor," Nastase said, "is that these talks lead to a solution that will be the result of the internal will and consensus of only the Yugoslav peoples."

National Bank Governor Explains Economic Situation

92BA0160C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Nov 91 p 8

[Unattributed article from TANJUG: "The Only Legitimate Central Bank"]

[Text] Belgrade—Leading figures in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Financial Corporation, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the coordinating committee of commercial banks to refinance our credit, and certain business circles have shown full understanding for the economic situation in Yugoslavia in a conversation with a delegation of the Board of Governors of the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ]. They were informed that even under the circumstances of the war Yugoslavia has been promptly paying the fixed and guaranteed obligations that have come due and that are backed by the federation and the National Bank. More than $2 billion has been set aside for that purpose this year, Dusan Vlatkovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, declared after his return from the United States.

The federation or National Bank of Yugoslavia are the guarantors of most of the total foreign debt, which amounts to about $14.5 billion. More precisely, this is a sum in the amount of almost $11 billion. Of course, all the republics bear joint and several liability. But under

international law, in case of a dispute the burden falls on all without exception—on the principle of all for one and one for all. This means that it will be paid by that republic that has the assets. The attempt of the unilaterally seceded parts of Yugoslavia, that is, of Slovenia and Croatia, to regulate matters with creditors directly, bypassing the National Bank of Yugoslavia, has so far not succeeded, although these efforts have recurred one after another, Vlatkovic said.

International financial institutions, organizations, and banks, which are the creditors, are, according to him, once again sticking by their previous positions that they recognize exclusively the legal existence of Yugoslavia and of its central bank until the military conflicts end in Croatia, until the political crisis is resolved, and until the country's new system is defined.

The delegation of the Board of Governors of the NBJ visited not only Washington and New York, but also monetary authorities and representatives of commercial banks in Paris, London, Rome, and Frankfurt, in order to inform them first hand concerning the economic and financial situation in the country and the measures that this body is taking under the present dramatic circumstances, especially since the one-sided secession of Slovenia and Croatia. It was pointed out to them on that occasion that those two republics have not been excluded from the country's monetary system, but abandoned it.

It is encouraging to learn that representatives of international financial institutions, organizations, and commercial banks are expressing a willingness to continue cooperation and to renew the standby arrangements as soon as circumstances allow. Incidentally, one of the reasons for postponing the visit of representatives of international capital to Yugoslavia in the present situation is so that they will not be accused of interfering with the country's internal affairs or being committed to any side, Dusan Vlatkovic said.

The specialists of the International Financial Corporation are including Yugoslavia among the 10 countries with which cooperation is most extensive. Certain prestigious banks are ready to reestablish cooperation when the time is right.

The general conclusion following the numerous meetings is that the legitimacy of the National Bank of Yugoslavia and of federal institutions is still recognized and that they will not bypass them and enter into separate arrangements with any republic.

Federal

Ways To Solve Serb-Croat Conflict Discussed

92BA0130D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 91 p 10

[Interview with Dr. Dejan Janca of the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Belgrade by Jovan Radovanovic; place and date not given: "Dr. Dejan Janca, Professor of International Law, on EEC Documents and His Proposal To Establish International Administration in Territories Caught Up in War: Yugoslavia Was Broken Up Before The Hague"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Documents coming from The Hague, although incomplete, insist on the only real solution—the preservation of Yugoslavia as a whole. No one in foreign countries is taking federal institutions into account any more. The Army has removed itself from outside control. International, temporary administration for a term of 15 years.

"The basic problem is how to halt this dreadful civil war which is aimed at the destruction of national groups and which has created unprecedented chaos in the military, political, economic, and legal fields. Unfortunately, at this time I do not see any force that can halt the conflict. There are too many armed formations that lie outside any type of control; in some parts of the country, there is a duality of government authority, while in even more there is anarchy. This is why the assistance of the international community is valuable."

Thus began BORBA's interview with Dr. Dejan Janca of the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Belgrade and a professor of International Law at Novi Sad University. As a "driving" member of the government and of the Opposition Round Table of experts in Sarajevo, he has proposed a solution for the territories in which the war is still being waged, the so-called "krajinas" or frontier areas that constitute the central location of the conflict between Serbs and Croats. Mr. Janca's proposal, that temporary—of 15 years' duration, to be more exact—international administration be established in these territories, has provoked on the one hand genuine consternation and on the other hand the interest and recognition of experts and people with good intentions.

Place Where Leaders Meet

[Radovanovic] In your opinion, what opportunities for Yugoslavia have the proposals from The Hague engendered?

[Janca] First of all, that is the only place where Yugoslav political leaders who hold effective power in the state are coming together, albeit not of their own free will. Also, the documents from The Hague, although incomplete, are not that bad, because they insist on what is in my opinion the only real solution—preserving Yugoslavia as a whole, in some way....

[Radovanovic] It is known that you do not agree with those who contend quite vocally that Yugoslavia is being broken up in The Hague.

[Janca] We ourselves fell apart internally. Caught up in civil war, we effectively do not exist as a state. We

possess a certain semblance of legality towards the outside world, but only in part, because in foreign countries as well, no one is taking federal institutions seriously any more. Just look at the SFRY Presidency, whose composition, decisionmaking, and effective power are under suspicion. Of the four members, at least two of them are unable to say that they enjoy the backing of the majority of their own constituency. This is true of Sejdo Bajramovic, and now Branko Kostic as well, and essentially Jovic and the other Kostic are no better off. We have a Federal Executive Council that has no power whatsoever, so that it comes as no surprise that no one in the world takes these institutions seriously, despite the fact that they have maintained some sort of legal status.

And Yugoslavia was not broken up in The Hague; that was done by the republican oligarchies before that conference.

Return to Normal Life

[Radovanovic] If there is for all practical purposes competition in the republican centers in terms of rejecting proposals from The Hague, are there also certain expectations among the people?

[Janca] The "documents" from The Hague are in many regards understated. This is completely understandable, especially since "our" side should be much more active at this conference. The Hague, once again, is the place where leaders who, as I have already said, are the only ones wielding any sort of power in this country meet, admittedly under pressure from the international community. However, Gen. Kadijevic is not present in The Hague, and from day to day it becomes increasingly obvious that the Army has removed itself from outside control, while commitments are being assumed there in its name. The republican leaders play their roles there in the eyes of the world, but as soon as they return here they thwart the agreements that they have signed. Who can assume commitments in The Hague in the name of powerful armed formations that are under no one's control?

[Radovanovic] What area would be included under international administration?

[Janca] I think that the most objective measure of this is the 1991 census, and international administration would be introduced in territories where war is currently being waged and where Serbs are in a majority according to the census. International administration would offer these people greater security so that they can safely return to their homes. If this area were to be under Serbian, Croatian, or even Army rule, I am not certain that it would be possible to reestablish the former structure of the population. International administration is objective, impartial, and its top goal would be to ensure peace and the safety of all inhabitants, regardless of nationality. Consequently, it would have to ensure the organization of economic, legal, and cultural life in these regions; quite simply, to ensure a return to normal life.

What Is the Goal of the Serbian State?

[Radovanovic] Why does your proposal to introduce international administration to the crisis areas in Yugoslavia specify that this should last at least 15 years?

[Janca] I think that that is the minimum period necessary to heal wounds, for people to cool off, and then for them to be able to decide by plebiscite whether they want to prolong international administration or to place themselves under the dual sovereignty of the states of the Serbian and Croatian nations, under a so-called condominium. In the history of the international community, condominiums—which were primarily established by the colonial powers in certain African territories—have resulted in a rapprochement between states in conflict, because they shared responsibility for the same territory. I believe that after 15 years this could happen in this land as well, even though this seems utterly unlikely right now.

[Radovanovic] Do you think that this proposed solution could be quickly "implemented," given the controversial reactions that it has encountered?

[Janca] I believe that the solution offered by the government and the Opposition Round Table would be acceptable to both sides. This because it would ensure that for 15 years there would be no flareups of armed conflict and unrest in these territories. In addition, a decision on the sovereignty of these territories is avoided, since they are under international administration. If after 15 years the population decides in favor of a condominium arrangement, then this too would be satisfactory to both sides: There would be guarantees for the security and complete safety and protection of the Serb population, which according to President Milosevic is the sole goal of the Serbian state. This region would not become part of Serbia, which is important to the Croatian side. And after 15 years, when borders in Europe will scarcely be of any importance, because even now moves are being made to pull them down, these territories would not be an object of contention between Serbs and Croats.

This type of proposal, if it is to succeed, should come from our representatives in The Hague. The essence of any decision concerning conflicts of this sort is to effect a compromise. This is a compromise solution; but as we can see, our representatives in The Hague continue to stick to exclusive positions, failing to realize that compromise means sacrificing some pretensions in order to bring about the realization of other ones.

Data on War Casualties, Damages Reported

92BA0122C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Oct 91 p 9

[Unattributed article: "More Than 1,000 Casualties"]

[Text] Belgrade—More than 1,000 dead and about $20 billion of damage, these are the figures from the balance

sheet of the war in Yugoslavia presented by a representative of the federal government in the annual assembly of the IMF and World Bank in Bangkok. This is the first and so far the only time that anyone in official circles has spoken out at all on the topic of the price of the war in Yugoslavia.

However much that issue may preoccupy us, it is difficult to forecast and still more difficult to make any kind of precise calculations, because the war is still being waged, and no one knows when and how it will end.

The winds of war are causing people to move, and the Yugoslav Red Cross estimates their number at more than 300,000. At this moment, most of the refugees are in Serbia—123,860, Croatia—110,500, and Bosnia-Hercegovina—63,420. It is feared that the number of refugees is much greater, but the records on them are becoming increasingly difficult to keep, because Slovenia and Croatia are no longer supplying those figures.

Even when the Yugoslav crisis is resolved, how will the right lines of division among the various nationalities be drawn? What will happen to the more than 13 percent of the children from mixed marriages, what will happen to the population, which is most mixed in precisely the areas where the fighting has been fiercest, and what will happen to those three million Yugoslavs who have lost their homeland?

The war has also reduced the foreign exchange remittances of Yugoslavs, which in the first six months of this year are down nearly $694 million from the same period of last year. Up until a decade and a half ago, Yugoslavia was the largest construction site in Europe; 40 percent of the social product went into capital investment. But since the beginning of the eighties, it has fallen among the world's seven largest debtors. If we add to this the devastation of the war, the door is wide open to economic depression.

Yugoslavia's convertible debt, according to calculations of foreign analysts, amounted to $16.3 billion at the end of September. That amount is divided as follows: More than $6 billion is owed by Serbia, $3.8 billion by Croatia, $2.5 billion by Slovenia, $2.1 billion by Bosnia-Hercegovina, $970 million by Macedonia, and $680 million by Montenegro. If the independence of Croatia and Slovenia is recognized, will they repay almost half of the Yugoslav debt when 85 percent of the foreign exchange reserves are being held by the National Bank of Yugoslavia?

Yugoslavia's gross product this year will probably fall by one-fourth, which will put it among the African countries in the greatest jeopardy. Even this year's anticipated record agricultural production, 5 percent greater than last year, does not guarantee that we can have enough food to get through this winter because of the state of war.

As for visible trade, the tradition of the deficit has continued. However, although exports in the first nine months were off 8 percent ($12.19 billion in value terms), the deficit over that period was $593 million, and that is only half of last year's at the same time, because our purchases this year, worth $12.8 billion, are all of 12.2 percent greater than those for the same period of last year. As far as the inflow from work done on capital investment projects in the world is concerned, it has already been cut in half—from $120 million to $60 million. Perhaps the most reliable evidence that Yugoslavia has become an extremely uncertain country can be seen from the fact that foreign capital has ceased to come into the country at all.

It is worth recalling that as the Yugoslav governmental and political crisis became more acute, the first thing that happened was that negotiations with the IMF on the anticipated $1 billion were put on ice. The European Community then postponed application of the so-called third financial protocol, which would have assured Yugoslavia an inflow of about $1.1 billion over the next five years. Even the $300-million loan from the World Bank, which had been approved, was postponed. According to certain estimates, this year's earnings in foreign exchange from tourism will barely reach $400 million, and even that was achieved in the first half of the year.

In recent years, Yugoslavia has been recording about $2.5 billion in gross foreign exchange revenues from transportation services. When accounts are drawn up at the end of the year and all expenses accounted for, transportation will have "taken in" about $1.2 billion in net foreign exchange income.

The actual damage this year cannot be established by any transportation institution at this point. In the first half of the year, when the war had only begun to raise its head above the horizon, the losses on the rail network of the Yugoslav Railroad reached about 58 billion dinars, and it is estimated that the loss for the first nine months will be a third greater than that amount.

Slovenia

Peterle Government May Face No-Confidence Vote

92BA0143A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
16 Nov 91 p 17

[Article by Janko Lorenci: "Is It the End of Peterle?"]

[Text] The socialists have a good nose. They were consequently the first to lean toward and take up the idea of a vote of (no) confidence in the government, which has recently been literally rolling along the road. This had been discussed in whispers even before that, within various parties, as one of the possibilities for resolving the political crisis, which is now completely obvious. For one reason or another, everyone hesitated. The socialists, however, showed the best political reflexes once again, and said that the emperor had no clothes, and with this,

the fate of the government was probably sealed. The parties will have to take a position on the initiative sooner or later. Some of them will probably be unhappy about this, and probably Lojze Peterle as well, whom the news caught by surprise while he was on one of his fumbling trips somewhere.

The socialists' proposal is thus interesting primarily because it makes possible an abrupt replacement of the government, without first having to send the entire Slovene population off to new elections. It would consequently save a great deal of time, and that is the essential thing. If we waited for a constitution, a new electoral law, and everything else, the elections would be in a year or two. That is much too late. We wrote three months ago in this editorial column that Peterle's government, linked by fate with Demos, certainly deserves credit for political independence, but is jeopardizing that very same independence through its incompetent rule (primarily economic), and may render it completely hollow in terms of content. Events after that only confirmed this impression, and the government's real balance sheet, in our opinion, is dramatically different from the one that the prime minister—how characteristic—offered the public in Bogensperski Grad [the castle in Bogensperg], i.e., far away from everyday reality.

If we condense things a great deal, that balance sheet is shown in the unchanged economic system, the absence of a clear economic policy and economic vision, and the growing economic and social pressures. That is the situation in the material area, which is easily measured. In the "spiritual" and nonmaterial sphere, which is more elusive but no less important, indications of social pathology are being manifested more and more severely: growing lawlessness, the insensitivity of the central and local authorities to public opinion, the lack of concern about legitimacy and sometimes even legality, the penetration of political polarization and sometimes even some hostility into the intimate sphere, the exhaustion of social energy.... The death knell is by no means ringing yet for Slovene democracy, and the authorities are not the only ones responsible for any of the material and "ethereal" situations described—but they have contributed a decisive share to each of them, because they are, of course, the authorities.

This gloomy picture of Slovenia will not improve, even if critical external circumstances change for the better as early as tomorrow (sudden international recognition, a quick end to the Croatian war). The heart of the Slovene illness is at home, gathered particularly in the authorities' (the government, Demos) incompetence and internal conflicts, without our going any deeper. This makes the government less and less credible, less and less worthy of confidence, and after two, three, or four months in the midst of social protests, the present governing crew would probably already be completely helpless, even if it became brilliant overnight. In short, if Slovenia wants to halt this slide toward the bottom, which the government, on one hand, is "leading" with its terrible routine, lack of invention, and inflexibility, and, on the other hand, with improbable energy and obstinacy (privatization!), then it seems that Peterle's team must inevitably be replaced by a new one. Since the times are so sensitive, we are in a great hurry.

Jansa's famous attack upon Peterle as a prime minister was condemned to failure in advance, because the minister wanted to carry out the operation decently, within the family, within Demos. Now, things are more serious, primarily because Demos has already been half-dead ever since the schism in the SDZ [Slovene Democratic Alliance]. The disintegration of the ruling coalition is the main condition for the emergence of a new ruling coalition. At the same time, different circumstances are ripening. This is clearly shown in the internal turmoil in different parties, both the ruling ones and the opposition ones, where it is all a hubbub. It is not completely clear what sort of wine will come out of this grape juice, but Skolc's LDS [Liberal Democratic Party] and Ribicic's SDP [Party of Democratic Reform], for example, are in serious difficulties. Even if they do not fall apart, a large number of officials and deputies may leave them.

Many people think that this party migration is oriented primarily toward the new star in the current Slovene political sky, Rupel's Democrats. Those people from the ruling coalition whose own parties are too right-wing for them, and those from the opposition whose parties are too left-wing for them, are supposed to desert to the Democrats. For the time being, Rupel's people are successfully spreading the belief that they will be, or already are, the first serious and strong central party. They will still have to confirm this, but for now they are being brought to the forefront primarily by the weakness and confusion of the other parties, the voluminous collection of prominent names that they can afford, and that same psychological impetus that they received by repute from Pirnat, who, with his aggressiveness, is actually a very meritorious person.

It already seems now, however, that the Democrats will have the chief word in putting together the new government, if the present one falls. It is hardly likely that any of the opposition parties would receive the mandate to form a new government, and that also applies to the Peasants, Liberals, and Greens in Demos. In principle, of course, Peterle could succeed Peterle, but that also seems unlikely, among other things because the Christian Democrats' maneuvering room for concluding coalition alliances is at least currently very limited, and almost certainly does not extend into the opposition camp.

The Democrats' hands are much less tied in this regard. But will they even be able to accept the challenge and seize the opportunity?

In its own way it is risky. If they cooperate in overthrowing Peterle, that does not mean that they are sure to get the mandate; and if they do get it, that does not mean that they will get enough allies for ruling any more firmly, even if they were satisfied with a minority

government. The game with a vote of (no) confidence also means that the Democrats would be gambling with some present ministerial positions, and such things are important in practical politics. It seems, however, that Rupel, Bavcar, and others, so to speak, are condemned not to stop for anything on the path that they started with their departure from Pirnat's hall. They will either reach the top, or sink into mediocrity.

Ever since the socialist initiative, in fact, taking a position on a vote of no confidence has been, so to speak, inevitable; and it is hard to imagine that Rupel's Democrats would support Peterle on this, without thereby losing all of their suddenly acquired political capital. To be sure, they already had a plan similar to the present socialist initiative in their drawer. Their candidate for the one to form a new government is also supposed to have been designated already—Igor Bavcar.

That corpulent politician is said to be a pragmatist and nonideologue (he already demonstrated this sufficiently in his youth); he has experience in the government and in political leadership in general (the committee), and he is undoubtedly a competent person. If he is the police minister, then he is still not Ertl. That opinion is fairly widespread among politicians and the public. With such a mandate-holder from a central and nonideological party, which the Democrats are conditionally said to be for now, it would probably be possible to form a government that would fulfill some necessary conditions: It would be primarily a technocratic or expert government; it would have some continuity, since it would probably inherit at least some of the ministers in the present government; it would be more competent than the present one, since Bavcar himself is competent enough that he could hope to surround himself with truly capable people, and this very fact would provide the vitally necessary credibility that the present government has lost.

Of course, we have yet to see what will actually happen. Peterle's possible fall theoretically opens up all sorts of coalition combinations, even the craziest ones. To be sure, the Bavcar variant seems the most likely, but to a great extent that depends not only on the Democrats, but also, of course, on the other parties that are either potential members of such a coalition or would at least quietly support it in the parliament. From Demos, these would be the Greens and possibly the Social Democrats, and from the opposition, probably all three parties. At any rate, it will be an interesting test of their responsibility. An opportunity for Slovenia to get a better government, as long as there is still time, is here; if it is not utilized, we will not reach the next elections without holes in our shoes.

Presidency Member Drnovsek Discusses His Role

92P20066A Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovenian 13 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by "de": "Reputation of a Peaceful Slovene"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 13 Nov—Officially, the Slovene Assembly has not yet recalled the SFRY Presidency member, Dr. Janez Drnovsek, from his position, although the October decision states that "conditions no longer exist for Slovenia to participate in federal institutions."

However, this is not the only controversy surrounding Drnovsek. In a talk on the private TV channel A, which we partially summarize here, this man with an unclear job description answered this and a number of other questions.

Answering a question about his role in the Slovene delegation to The Hague, Janez Drnovsek explains that the last time he participated together with all the SFRY Presidency members at the conference session was on 18 October, but that he is not a member of the Slovene delegation.

He has his opinion also regarding the Slovene approach in The Hague. He claims that it is impossible to insist on recognition only, but that it will be necessary to show constructive participation. Slovenia originated the idea of a loose association. However, because of the war, things have changed drastically. Parties that shoot at each other with all available weapons cannot talk, for example, about a customs union. However, in Drnovsek's opinion, The Hague offers at the moment the best possibility for drawing up an agreement on the final settling of Yugoslav accounts: "The intervention of the Yugoslav Army in Slovenia was a major mistake in the process of solving the Yugoslav crisis. This was the Rubicon, a step from a political into a military logic. I personally feel that this turnabout has given rise to a firm response that it is no longer possible to negotiate for a common life with the partners in Yugoslavia."

Drnovsek also mentioned the announced and retracted replacement in the Slovene Foreign Ministry. There were offers that he replace Peterle. He said: "I have not accepted any, and they were used in public without my knowledge."

Answering the question whether he will be a candidate for president of Slovenia, Drnovsek said that he has not yet made a decision, that it is necessary to wait for the constitution, the election law, the rules of the game. However, if he were to decide to run he would count above all on his economic program, his nonpartisanship ("I have not chosen any party, I would much rather insist on my own independent stance.") He noted that his image, as reflected in the opinion polls, could be attributed to the Slovenes, who do not like overly great extremes.

EC Sanctions Will Directly Hurt Economy

92BA0142A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 15 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by Tonja Slokar: "Elimination of Import Quotas Will Affect Slovenia"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 14 Nov—According to the EC's "Official Journal," which came out late this afternoon and will go into effect tomorrow, the EC states will begin to implement the economic measures against Yugoslavia that were already adopted last week; as one may gather from the very sketchily written items, the sanctions will directly affect primarily the Yugoslav republics' trade with the EC, especially exports of textiles, meat, wood products, and steel.

Yugoslavia, and Slovenia along with it, under special trade agreements concluded with the EC, enjoyed special customs exemptions for exports of certain products, which made it possible for our goods to be competitive in foreign markets, without having to figure lower export prices substantially into higher domestic ones. With the elimination of import quotas, and the resulting customs exemptions, Yugoslav industry has been pushed against the wall. Slovene industry has been forced even more against the wall, since on the average it exported more to the EC, and the EC's economic sanctions also coincide with a time when Slovene industry is also losing a significant part of the Yugoslav market. Exporters of livestock and meat mostly sold to Italy, on the basis of local border trade. Ninety percent of the Slovene textiles exported went to the EC and the United States, and we also sold 70 percent of Slovene furniture to the EC states, while some enterprises, for instance, even sold everything they produced to Germany, if there were special programs that established long-term relationships between them and their foreign partners.

The introduction of tariffs also means that all these types of Slovene goods will become considerably more expensive in the EC. This will have the least effect upon furniture, 4-6 percent, and the most upon textiles and meat, for which exporters are even figuring on a price increase of more than 50 percent. Aware that they will certainly lose foreign buyers, since no one will want to buy expensive meat anymore, Slovene exporters of cattle and meat have already announced that they will cease exports as of tomorrow.

The textile producers say that they will continue selling to the EC, at lower prices if they have to, since they hope that the economic measures will only apply to Slovenia until 2 December, when, according to EC announcements, positive selective measures are to be introduced, judging by indications from abroad, and Slovenia is also to participate in them. Of course, as our experts state, it is also possible that upon reducing export prices, the exporters would experience countermeasures by the EC states, since they could accuse us of dumping prices. Admittedly, according to claims by some Slovene enterprises, they are already receiving cancellations of orders from some foreign customers, but one should be cautious about such statements, since our enterprises can thus find an excuse for shoddy products or services.

Although the Slovene government and the Economic Community as well claim that Slovenia will not have to eat the soup as hot as it was cooked in the EC (and lively diplomatic and economic talks between our representatives and the EC members are under way for this purpose), through the continuation of the economic measures adopted Slovenia would also suffer indirect consequences, which would be recognized in a decline in industrial production and foreign exchange earnings, an increase in unemployment, and so forth. It would be particularly affected if the sanctions were also followed by a ban on sales of oil to Yugoslavia. It is true that a fuel shortage would most affect the southern republics, which are isolated because of the closed roads, but Slovenia is also completely dependent upon imports of fuel oil.

Croatia

Tudjman Speaks on UN Resolution, Cease-Fire

LD2811225891 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by correspondent Mladen Lackovic; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Lackovic] Mr. President, the UN Security Council has adopted Resolution 721 on the arrival of Blue Helmets in Yugoslavia, i.e., the resolution upon which the next steps of the world organization concerning the resolving of the Yugoslav crisis will be based. How significant is it for Croatia and for the Croatian policy?

[Tudjman] The adoption of the UNSC Resolution means that the Yugoslav crisis and, in real terms, the war in Croatia, have assumed the broadest possible international proportions. It means that this war and the aggression against Croatia have become the problem of the world organization, the United Nations. It means that this is no longer just Europe's problem, but also of the entire world and the biggest world organization. And it in itself means that we will finally have the Blue Helmets as a guarantee for the way out of this war. We will therefore be no longer left to our own devices. For Croatia—unequal in this war waged by the strongest communist army in Europe after the Soviet one, which can no longer count on Croatia being isolated—the arrival of Blue Helmets in Croatia therefore ensures that the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], and the Serbian aggression together with it, would have to leave Croatia. This is the significance of this decision.

[Lackovic] Does the adoption of this resolution, or document, mean that the decision-making on the Yugoslav crisis is now in a way being transferred to New York? Or rather, what will the role of the EC be in all this from now on?

[Tudjman] In a way it has already been transferred. The EC attempted to resolve the Yugoslav crisis and the war in Croatia by political negotiations and in a democratic manner, but the EC did not have the mechanism for it to be able to succeed in imposing its views on the solution

of this crisis and ending the war in Croatia, so that this role of seeking a solution has been taken over by the world organization, and I would say more specifically, that the United States has again become involved, as can be seen from the fact that the special envoy of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Vance, former U.S. secretary of state. [sentence as heard] I would not say, therefore, that the United States or the United Nations have taken over the role of the EC, but they have taken it over in the essential matter of ending the war, and it is clear that they will, by virtue of this, have an influence on the final solution. But I believe that the Hague conference will continue after peace is established and the peace forces begin to take on their role.

[Lackovic] We are witnessing the fact that at this moment the cease-fire is not being observed by the other side, by which I mean the Yugo Army and Serbia. However, the cease-fire, or its observance, is a prerequisite for the Blue Helmets to be deployed in Croatia. What is the likely development of the situation in view of this?

[Tudjman] Yes, the cease-fire is not being observed. It is not being observed primarily by the Yugoslav Army and the insurgent Chetniks in Croatia, and as I said a few days ago in my address, they are doing this even now in an attempt during this period before the arrival of the Blue Helmets to seize a few more towns in Croatia, to conquer what they can with a view to including it within the borders of greater Serbia.

But I nevertheless maintain that the pressure of this world opinion, which is now obviously more stubborn than it was until recently, has made these aggressors, who are waging such a criminal war in Croatia, embark on less offensive activities than those they have been carrying out thus far. Last night I talked with the Head of the EC Observer Mission in Croatia as well as with Ambassador Van Houten and Ambassador [name indisinct], who is a special advisor to Mr. Vance. We talked about these breaches of the cease-fire.

According to information at the disposal of the EC Observer Mission, the Yugoslav Army has breached this agreement on about 130 occasions since the Geneva agreement on a cease-fire. However, the EC, the EC observers, also voiced their remarks that Croatian forces had also breached this cease-fire in about 30 cases. Understandably, I pointed out to the gentlemen that if a cease-fire was at stake this matter could not be considered just in a formal way, because after all, the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian forces that have been sent in to Croatia, to various areas, are waging a war in order to conquer Croatian areas and to destroy Croatian settlements, a criminal war in order to exterminate the Croatian population, like in the recent case of Skabrnja and Nadin.

But I also said that we are in favor of honoring the cease-fire and that we, on our side, would do everything, including lifting the blockade of barracks, so as to enable peace forces to come. However, I said so, and it is also clear to both the gentlemen I have just talked to and to the Geneva conference that the road from the end of the war until the lasting cease-fire is long.

Finally, one of the gentlemen said himself that there were cities in the world in which there were never any cease-fires and in which, in a certain sense, an underground war was being waged, while the one here is among the dirtiest and bloodiest ever waged. I therefore think that the very arrival, i.e., the announcement of the arrival of Blue Helmets, has already had an effect on reducing the JNA offensive operations against Croatia, and the very decision of the UN Security Council will also have the same effect, let alone the arrival of Blue Helmets, so that these offensive operations of the JNA would have to be reduced, and consequently, when the main operations end, battles would gradually end, because the duty of Blue Helmets is, in the agreement we reached, not to wait until every combat on ground ends, but that they should help achieve the cease-fire and ensure the establishment of a state and legal system throughout Croatia and the gradual departure of the Yugoslav Army from the entire territory of Croatia, with the simultaneous arrival of Blue Helmets in these crisis areas, where war operations were waged until now, and until the expulsion of all outlaw groups. Also, one of the important tasks, the reason why we agreed to the arrival of Blue Helmets, is in deed that alongside the departure of the Yugoslav Army from the entire Croatian territory, the disarmament of all illegal terrorist, outlaw and armed groups—which are now linked with the army—must be carried out, or these groups must leave alongside the Army. This is therefore the purpose of the Blue Helmets from the Croatian point of view.

[Lackovic] Mister President, the issue in which the public has lately been particularly absorbed, to which you gave a partial answer, is the distribution of Blue Helmets, and second, in some way linked with this, it is fairly frequently mentioned and to some extent reproached to the Croatian authorities to have allowed the departure of the JNA, fully armed, and that this same army is now again shooting at Croatian cities and settlements from Bosnia and Serbia.

[Tudjman] Well, you see, we agreed that, in fact we asked from the very beginning of the heightening of the war in Croatia, the spread of the war, total war in Croatia, in the knowledge that we alone, Croatia on its own, does not have sufficient armed forces to stop this aggression, to resist this aggression by force; we called for internationalization, for the intervention of international peace-keeping forces, precisely in order to achieve peace. That is important. In order to put a stop to the bloodshed, to prevent the further suffering of the Croatian nation, and to prevent the destruction of Croatian towns. That was our aim when we made our request for the deployment of peace-keeping forces. And with the present decision in the Security Council on the deployment of peace-keeping forces we are achieving this main aim. We have at the same time agreed that the peace-keeping forces should be

deployed on the borders of Croatia, of course, but also that they should come to all crisis areas where these war operations have been carried out, because their only task is to establish the constitutional and legal order in the Republic of Croatia, throughout the area, to make it possible to establish the constitutional and legal order, as I said, either by the disarming or the departure of these terrorist, outlaw Chetnik groups and Serbian extremists, or however you wish to describe them.

The other question which is concerning the public is why we are allowing the Yugoslav Army to leave with their weapons, their arms. During its aggressive expansion in Croatia, the Yugoslav Army used as an excuse, justified its aggression before the world, the international public, the EC and the United Nations, by the fact that it was on the one hand protecting the supposedly threatened Serbian population, and on the other that it had to liberate its garrisons, its barracks—not only its soldiers were threatened in the garrisons, but also the families of the officer corps, and so on—so that in the end we agreed to unblock those garrisons in order to indicate to the EC, and now the United Nations, that we are not interested in waging war with the Yugoslav Army, that we do not want to detain the Yugoslav Army on our territory, on the contrary that we want it to leave Croatia, the entire territory of Croatia as soon as possible. But the question is then asked as to why we agreed that it should leave with its equipment and weapons.

Well, because they did not want to leave without their weaponry and equipment while the EC had accepted their arguments that the Croatian side, Croatian Army, had confiscated the weapons which the Yugoslav Army had been transporting from Slovenia to Serbia, in other words, that we had captured these weapons, and equally, that we had seized weaponry from the army's numerous depots in Croatia. This is a fact. Therefore, we could not deny it. We had to confiscate these arms in order to arm ourselves, and wage this war against the Yugoslav Army in its present form and the aggression carried out by Serbia and Montenegro on Croatian soil. Therefore, in this final stage of our talks with international factors we agreed to lift our blockade, and agreed that they could leave with their weaponry, but on condition that the EC observers monitor this and that they guarantee that those forces and those weapons would not be redeployed in the war against Croatia.

We were given such guarantees, and given the fact that peace forces should arrive it seems to me that we really do have guarantees that this is what is going to happen.

The question is also being posed of why we agreed that they leave only those areas where no war was being waged—something that has not been clarified completely among our public—that is, northwestern Croatia, where those barracks were encircled while not leaving at the same time those crisis areas where combat operations were being carried out, from Knin to eastern Slavonia. We accepted this agreement simply because the other side in the negotiations—as you know, two sides take part in negotiations; consequently, the other side did not want to agree to leave the crisis areas immediately because they alleged that the war had broken out there due to the Serbian population coming under threat. This is, of course, an excuse.

To oppose this I put forward the fact that in Croatia, until the Knin rebellion, 18 August last year, no one had been threatened or killed, let alone imprisoned, but that this war had broken out in the wake of that rebellion. Consequently, this aggression, this attempt to topple the Croatian authorities, to conquer Croatian areas, brought about all this war. Therefore, in such a situation we agreed, as I told you earlier, that a peace force should also go to these crisis areas so as to enable the army, too, to have an excuse to withdraw, so now its role could be played, so to speak, by someone else.

[Lackovic] Finally, Mr. President, judging by your assessments and experience, what is the realistic deadline for the UN peace forces arriving in Croatia?

[Tudjman] We required their immediate arrival, precisely because the aggressors had plans to take advantage of this period between the decision on engaging peace forces in Croatia and their arrival for conquering as much territory as possible. However, this is clearly not possible. Preparations for the engagement of peace forces in other cases have often lasted more than several months, usually not less than about a month. In our conditions, given the existing understanding that the war is assuming such dimensions to which Europe can no longer be reconciled, and because the war in Croatia is spreading across the border to neighboring Hungary, it seems that conditions have been created for the Blue Helmets to arrive in about 10 days' time.

It seems to me that this is also helped by the decisions of European countries with regard to to recognizing Croatia—they say by Christmas—but I think that this will happen even sooner, around mid December. It therefore seems to me that—as I have already said in my address to citizens of Croatia, to the Croatian people—we are (?living through) the last days, the critical days of the war, but that we are about to be recognized, and that we will come out of this bloody and criminal war—imposed on us by the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor and the Communist Yugoslav Army—before the end of the year, as I said even before the decisions on the engagement of the peace forces are made.

[Lackovic] Thank you, Mr. President.

Reaction to Statement on Paraga Units

92BA0131C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Nov 91 p 11

[Article by Sanja Modric: "Croatian Government Announces Showdown With Legions of Croatian Rights Party: Gauntlet to Paramilitary Paraga"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] On Sunday [3 November], after a string of holdups, armed showdowns, and house searches in Zagreb and other "peaceful" cities, the Supreme State Council, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Internal Affairs finally declared war on the Croatian Rights Party [HSP] and Paraga in particular. However, this reaction by the government is somewhat belated, and the showdown with the Croatian Defense Forces [HOS] could easily turn into a new war behind the one that is already going on.

The Croatian Rights Party appeared on the Croatian political scene before the elections, almost unobserved and through the back door. The handful of people around Dobroslav Paraga, Kresimir Pavelic, and the now deceased Ante Paradzik were a trivial political factor, and for a long time were simply shrugged off. However, the HSP quickly became very agile, and it has frequently been the case that precisely their announcements, pertaining to various matters, have been the first to arrive at the editorial offices of Croatian newspapers. Each "paper" bearing Dobroslav Paraga's signature has rivaled the one before it in its uncompromising criticism of the Croatian government, and with the passage of time, simple criticism has turned into genuine "yelling," and even into extremely direct insults.

Neither the top leadership nor the majority that supports it was willing to take Paraga's group very seriously. The HSP was labeled a minor party which, given its membership, had abnormally ambitious leaders. In official political speeches, Paraga and his "fold" were occasionally mentioned indirectly, through parenthetical digressions concerning "certain extremist parties" that were attempting to score as many political points as possible through petty maliciousness.

However, the war in Croatia proved to be the right time for rapid advancement of the Croatian Rights Party and its ultra-rightwing program, which espouses, among other things, a Croatia extending to the Drina River and including the Sandzak and the Gulf of Kotor. The HSP used the struggle for Croatian territory, in which the government of that republic has not fared well from the very outset, to promote its own armed forces. Through skillful propaganda and agitation, the HSP troops, calling themselves the HOS, advertised themselves as the only true combatants for the Croatian cause, and as the pure distillate of essential Croatian interests.

Excesses of Armed HSP Members

When HOS units were recently presented in public for the first time at Ban Jelacic Square during an HSP gathering, the party leaders guaranteed that the "boys" are fighting in the ranks of the National Guard Corps, and that for this reason there is no truth to the rumor that they constitute paramilitary formations and a party militia. Shortly thereafter, there was a string of semipublic excesses involving armed HSP members who, skillfully directed from party headquarters, began to think of themselves as the true Croatian combat elite.

The first problems, about which the public learned certain details after the fact, were experienced by the regular forces of defense and internal affairs in the extremely delicate situation involving negotiations with the commanders of the Yugoslav People's Army barracks in Zagreb. It was said that the soldiers at the "Marshal Tito" and "Dusan Corkovic" barracks in Zagreb had already decided to surrender on two occasions when "grinning" HSP forces attacked out of the darkness, shouting that they would kill all the soldiers. After that, of course, the gates to the barracks were closed again.

At press conferences, Paraga and the newly appointed head of the HSP military staff, Ante Dzapic, declared that everything being done by the Croatian government in the area of defense was plain treason. Ministers were called bunglers, ignoramuses, and good-for-nothings, while the Rights Party was deemed "the only party that can look the Croatian nation in the eye without shame." Troops of HOS volunteers left for the battlefields, ostensibly in response to an appeal by official opstina institutions, and Paraga recently announced that another 10,000 people were being prepared for the defense of Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, Jasenovac, etc.

In the meantime, under circumstances that have yet to be clarified, a car carrying one of the leaders of the HSP, Ante Paradzik, was riddled with bullets near Zagreb. Clearly, the HSP bitterly accused the Croatian government of committing this crime. Emphasizing that this was a political assassination, the HSP made it onto the front page of the newspapers, while all political parties in Croatia joined it in condemning the perpetrators of the act.

The methods of HSP "activity" were made unmistakably clear when about a month ago HSP members forced their way into the offices and headquarters of the Association of Visual Artists of Croatia in Zagreb, from which they expelled the previous "tenants" at gunpoint. Then, to the disgust of a large number of Zagrebians, but amidst absolutely no reaction by the institutions of the government and of the rule-of-law state, they arrogantly moved into the "expropriated" building and turned it into the headquarters for their military staff. Shortly thereafter, in front of "their" new headquarters, which is located in the very center of Zagreb, they brought in the real top leadership, which stayed there for weeks, perhaps as a warning to anyone who might have any objections to all of this.

The Croatian government was unable, or unwilling, to react to all of these actions by the HSP and its detachments. There could be many reasons for this, but it is obvious that there were circles within the top leadership who were unable to come to an understanding "about the HSP issue." While some felt that it is not wise to provoke dissent and conflict "within Croatian ranks" in the midst of war, others warned that the matter must nevertheless be cleared up immediately. They said that even during an (officially undeclared) war, the rule-of-law state must

function, and they warned that after the war it could be too late to appease the HSP.

Lately, there have been inarticulately formulated and ambiguous warnings coming from official sources directed at those who act "by illegitimate means..., etc.," but the HSP is still in the forcibly expropriated building, and the self-confidence that metastasized among HSP members because of that action is leading them even further, almost as far as a genuine hysteria of selfishness.

Belated Government Reaction

Praise for HOS forces has begun to spread in individual crisis areas where people have, with good cause, been unnerved by long-term suffering. Thus, it is possible to hear that they are the only brave heroes fighting for the nation, "while the guardists run away as fast as their legs will carry them," and even that Vukovar is standing its ground solely because of the heroic dedication of the HOS. Many members of Croatia's regular defense units contend that this is an outright lie, and speak of HOS troops solely in the context of looting, robbery, and unnecessary killing. They emphasize that the HOS does whatever it wants, and that it has no intention of subordinating itself to joint military defense command.

After a string of holdups, armed showdowns, and house searches committed by individuals in camouflage uniforms in Zagreb and other "peaceful" cities, accompanied by fears of uncontrolled rampages all over Croatia, the government finally reacted on Sunday. After so many months of silence, the statements from the headquarters of the Supreme State Council and the Ministries of Defense and of Internal Affairs reverberated like thunder. War was declared against the HSP and Paraga in particular, which is clearly the last thing that Croatia needs right now, but which is nevertheless inevitable.

It appears that international public opinion contributed to the top leadership's decision to finally settle scores with the HSP. Specifically, the statement notes that "international public opinion is concerned about the emergence and activities of the armed formations of the HSP, which it regards as a continuation of fascism." Reference is then made to the ban on party activities in the armed forces decreed by Dr. Franjo Tudjman on 15 October of this year, and it is alleged that the HSP, despite the ban, "is intensifying its activities in the formation of its own party militia." HOS members are specifically accused of profiteering in arms trading, of waging war "in bars," of stealing weapons, and of much more serious criminal acts, such as burglary, house searches, murder, and crimes against the civilian population. Reference is made to as many as 300 criminal acts committed recently by persons in HOS uniforms. It is also emphasized—something that will provoke howls of anger among HSP members—that "the HOS is not usable, and thus far they have not even been used in organized, defensive activities in Croatia." The government says that these units lack morale and expertise, and that many of the misguided young people have donned HOS uniforms without realizing that the HSP offers them a totalitarian, fascist system, instead of a democratic Croatia.

Finally, the government pledges that it will put an end to the noted criminal, terroristic, and anarchistic methods, for which it says it has adequate forces. It is feared, however, that this belated reaction by the legitimate republican institutions involves a task that will be difficult to carry through to the end. Specifically, the well-armed HSP legionnaires, who are clearly ready for anything, are already a very difficult nut for MUP and National Guard forces to crack, and the showdown with them could turn into a new war behind the one that is already going on. It remains to be seen what its epilogue will be.

Official on Pressure To Revise Constitution

92BA0122A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Seks, chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the Croatian Assembly, by Vlado Rajic; place and date not given: "Should the Croatian Constitution Be Changed?"]

[Text] One gets a terrible impression that the Constitution of Croatia is being changed. From the opposition parties and the party in power, from the military community and what is still for the present civilian community, because of the war or with the war as a cover. But it has been stated that the Croatian Constitution was adopted as the permanent document of the new era announced by the multiparty elections in May 1990. VJESNIK interviewed Vladimir Seks, chairman of the Assembly's Constitutional Commission, about the pressures.

[Rajic] Are the pressures for changes or indeed even a revision of the Constitution, in your opinion, the consequence of old habits in the attitude toward the constitutional document or of new needs in Croatia's constitutional practice?

[Seks] The demand to change the Croatian Constitution has several levels. First, it is the consequence of a failure to understand the text, a failure to understand that instead of one branch of authority, there are three that in the Croatian context have been adopted, as far as the Constitution is concerned, almost by consensus. The second level builds its demand on an irrational approach whereby criteria change depending on the seriousness of the situation Croatia faces. Under that banner, some people believe that a redistribution of constitutional powers would change something, while others believe that change itself is a solution. And both, at least at present, are short on arguments: Some say that this or that principle is not operative, others that this or that principle is being violated, they say by whom, and they say what ought to be written in the Constitution instead of that principle. The opposition parties represent the third level. They call for changing the Constitution as

one form of their criticism of the government. The fourth level is demanding a change of the semipresidential system into a purely parliamentary system. Finally, but probably not the last level, there are those who, to put it simply, do not accept the political line represented and conducted by the president of the republic.

[Rajic] It seems that all of that together is a consequence of the feeling that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is no longer as strong as it was, that the Constitution is actually a product of the HDZ, and that both together are affording revisionist demands, along with the expectation that there is actually no one to oppose them.

[Seks] The Croatian Democratic Community is a movement whose transformation from a movement into a true party has not been taken all the way to the end. The war halted that process as it did others. However, the war did not prevent the attempt to achieve a redistribution of power both in the Assembly and in other bodies of government through objections to the Constitution and through criticism of the HDZ, bypassing elections. All of that is based on the assessment that the HDZ is a wounded lion breathing its last breath, and that this should be taken advantage of for narrow party interests.

[Rajic] Was not the occasion for this created by formation of the Democratic Unity government, which, unlike the previous one, is not a purely party government?

[Seks] Possibly; however, the blow against the results of the election was struck first at the local level. It was actually in the opcinas that the opposition parties tried to change the party structure established by the elections. All of this is an attempt to twist the election, and the battlefield situation and appeal for national unity have actually been used to alter the makeup of the bodies of government, from the opcina upward.

[Rajic] It seems that the government is the target of criticism because supposedly it is not sufficiently under control of the Assembly. Does not that criticism put the government back in the status of an executive council?

[Seks] The Constitution is clear on that point. The government is accountable both to the Assembly and to the president of the republic. It seems to me, as far as this point is concerned, that the criticism has resulted not from the solution of the semipresidential system, but from the assessment that the constitutional balance has been upset. It is simply stated in this connection that the Assembly has been pushed aside, and almost nothing is said about the fact that the Assembly is actually not using all of its constitutional powers. That means that it should be more critical of the government, but also follow more closely the way the decisions of the government adopted in its sessions are carried out.

[Rajic] But, if the Assembly is to do something, it has to be convened. The critics of the constitutional system actually consider the occasional nature of the sessions to be a most flagrant violation of the Constitution.

[Seks] That violation would be very difficult to prove in the terms of the system. The Assembly is a representative and legislative body. For the Assembly to function strictly in accordance with the Constitution, there is still quite a bit of that to do. In the situation as it now stands, the essential thing is that the Assembly react more quickly, and that means that all its working bodies be operative, which is not the case today. To be sure, the general situation stands in the way of working full force, but I do not believe that even otherwise the Assembly would be seen in the way the Constitution calls for.

[Rajic] To tell the truth, the criticism of the Croatian Constitution is actually criticism of the institution of the president of the republic and of the president personally as well, which, given the flood of reproaches, is sometimes difficult to distinguish.

[Seks] That is understandable. The situation in Croatia is such that the president has the role of commander of the armed forces (under the Constitution), he is the key figure in negotiations with third parties (under the Constitution), and in both situations the line that he is taking does not depend exclusively on him, neither the military nor the negotiating line, nor the international line. This means, then, that everything that the other side does that is bad in these matters is attributed to the president and seen as a deficiency of his. And that is not the Constitution, nor is it the fact. It is from that point of departure that I find that some of the constitutional critics favor a revision of that status of the president of the republic and discontinuation of the semipresidential system as a whole, while some of them are for complete revision of Croatia's constitutional arrangement.

[Rajic] What is the critical mass of pressure to change the Constitution, and must a process to revise it be initiated under the Constitution?

[Seks] All the criticism of the Constitution so far has been legal and legitimate, but in my judgment this still has not been sufficient for the Constitution to be amended. It seems to me that attention should be paid precisely to the solutions in the Constitution, now that they are being criticized, and we should realize that to initiate the process one has to make a case with arguments as to who has betrayed the articles of the Constitution, when and how, what constitutional breach he committed in doing that, to what extent was the departure allowed by the Constitution itself, and how unconstitutional is the practice of the perpetrator. The other day, the Constitutional Commission received the view of the coordinating committee of seven opposition parties dated 7 October, which enumerated certain deficiencies of constitutional practice, but did not spell out the assessment that a possible unconstitutional act has been committed, what consequences would ensue under the Constitution, and so on. My position is that most of the criticism of the constitutional system and of the very text of the Constitution is still insufficient for the appropriate procedure to be initiated for its revision.

Mayor of Dubrovnik Discusses Fighting, Damage

92BA0131B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 91 p 8

[Interview with Dubrovnik Mayor Petar Poljaric by J. Radovanovic in Dubrovnik; date not given: "It Is a Wonder That I Am Alive"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] I contend that 30,000 shells have fallen on the central area of the opstina. The "Dubrovkinja" enterprise alone has lost 36 million German marks [DM] thus far. Our relations with Zagreb are extraordinary, Mr. Poljaric told our reporter.

Dubrovnik—"Isn't it a wonder that I am still alive?" Dubrovnik Mayor Petar Poljaric asked us when we dropped in on him at his office without any problem whatsoever, literally without being stopped even once. Obviously seeing the whole report about his death as a rather "bad joke," Poljaric tells us that his family has even received several "condolence telegrams" from Serbia, where he says he still has a number of good friends.

A one-hour "one-on-one" with the gentleman from Dubrovnik, after which it was possible to begin.

[Radovanovic] How many shells have fallen on Dubrovnik?

[Poljaric] I contend that there have been more than 30,000; and that on the central area of the opstina, from Konavle to Slano. There have been 10 or so that have fallen on the city itself, two have hit the old town. One fell at the corner of Boskovicev and Stradun, while the other hit the Rupe Museum (Dubrovnik's former granary).

[Radovanovic] Have you done an estimate of the "war damage" thus far in the territory of the opstina?

[Poljaric] No way! We still have no access to Konavle, Zida and the Dubrovnik River, Komolac, Slano.... We have not even recovered the dead from the western parts of the opstina. In any case, we know that our "Dubrovkinja" commercial enterprise alone has lost DM36 million because of the war. I won't even talk about the losses in the tourist trade.

[Radovanovic] Do you have an accurate figure of the number of your citizens who have perished?

[Poljaric] According to our information, it is 41. Although I must say that this is not complete, because we do not even know where dozens of our citizens are. In any event, they are not on the list of prisoners of war.

[Radovanovic] Negotiations are currently under way in Cavtat. What does Dubrovnik hope to achieve most of all in these negotiations?

[Poljaric] That the Army leave the territory of Croatia. Forever. However, since all negotiations proceed step by step, we first of all want to get water, electricity, the lifting of the city blockade, that communication be allowed, because we have no contact whatsoever with the many islands in our territory. The city itself has gone without electricity and water for 32 days now, although we are getting food by boat. We are under occupation, to say nothing of how our people are being shot at like clay pigeons. For example, a five-year-old child and his mother were wounded yesterday in Gruz.

[Radovanovic] How do you think all of this will look after the war?

[Poljaric] You should ask them. We have not destroyed Herceg Novi. We have not broken a single window pane in Herceg Novi or Trebinje, nor have we done anything bad on a single inch of their territory.

[Radovanovic] Tell us how relations are between Dubrovnik and Zagreb, because there has been much talk about Dubrovnik's desire for autonomy.

[Poljaric] What kind of autonomy? Who needs autonomy? These are crazy attempts to separate Dubrovnik from Croatia. In the referendum, 94 percent of the people were in favor of a sovereign Croatia! Moreover, Dubrovnik is one of the three most purely Croatian cities. And we have extraordinary relations with Zagreb.

[Radovanovic] What is the situation with Serbs in Dubrovnik?

[Poljaric] They make up 6.5 percent of our population, and they do not want to go. Some of them are volunteers in the guard. And there are very few of them who have left and are now shooting at us. But those are not Serbs who have lived here for a long time, but rather recent newcomers.

At the end of the interview, Mr. Poljaric told us that the key to the whole situation is to "stop the war." He told us that three years ago he had two heart operations at Belgrade's Dragisa Milovic Hospital, and he asked that we remove all "emotion" from our text if there happened to be too much of it on his part.

Rift Between SAO Krajina Leading Figures

92BA0127B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by B. Solesa: "The Subordinate Role Separates the Fellow Fighters"]

[Text] Knin—The political split, deep and sudden, that might have occurred in the ranks of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast [SAO] Krajina following the announcement signed on behalf of the Krajina MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] by Milan Martic, and which contains a number of unpleasant charges against the present Krajina government, which is headed by Dr. Milan Babic, was a real shock to Knin. Although Serbian Radio Knin did not carry the communication, the other media

broadcast the charges against those who concentrate power in their hands and are behaving despotically in politics.

Shifting the Burden

It is difficult to find out exactly what specific event caused the misunderstanding between those who until yesterday were faithful collaborators, but some things are obvious. As the military conflicts have spread over the entire rim of the still-undefined limits of the Krajina, the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] has been taking on an ever-larger burden of the fight and of the exercise of authority on its "shoulders." Although taken as an example of combat morale, the police and "Kninians" have not been able under those conditions to continue to be the main headquarters for directing the battles, but this has been taken over by the JNA, with strong systems and modern weapons, which alone can thwart the power of Croatia, which even now is fairly well-armed and equipped.

A different role is being planned for the police and "Kninians," one that would have more to do with establishing internal order in SAO Krajina than in conducting actual military operations, which have been taken over by officers of the JNA, trained in performing the most difficult wartime jobs. And it is somewhere in this connection that one should seek the reasons for the dissatisfaction on the part of Milan Martic and his bitterness that things have taken this turn It is of interest that none of the representatives of the government of SAO Krajina wants to say even one word against Martic.

Even Dr. Milan Babic, president and wartime commander of SAO Krajina, did not wish to do this and has refused every opportunity to talk about Milan Martic's public statement, giving as a reason the trip to Paris to attend the new international peace conference on the situation in Yugoslavia.

Off to Work as Usual

Risto Matkovic, deputy prime minister of SAO Krajina, offered an unofficial comment in a discussion of the Krajina's other problems.

This is how he sees the entire affair:

"None of us would like to say anything about the public statement and accusations by Milan Martic, and indeed the position of the government of SAO Krajina is to talk about this calmly so as not to make the differences any deeper and not to start a dispute at a time when we have war here around us.

"I completely understand Martic, who is a good man, but some things have to be understood. His, and I say 'his' advisedly, police displayed patriotism and courage at the time when the need was greatest. No one can dispute that, nor would any of us in the government wish to do so. But we must realize that Croatia at that time itself had only slightly more police than the Krajina itself. Now the situation is altogether different. Croatia has an army, with many arms, quite a bit of diverse armament obtained through various channels. What will happen tomorrow when Croatia also gets an air force? What kind of police can oppose that? We need cooperation, and by no means a conflict. We should think about these things and put them in their right place. I have nothing against Martic getting what he deserves and being defense minister....

"Every one of us is keenly interested in putting an end to this debate and exchange of fire, because it leads nowhere."

There are many in the Krajina with whom we had occasion to speak who see the thing the way Matkovic does. Meanwhile, Martic has continued to do his job as usual, and thus on Monday, that is, immediately after the public statement, he had a meeting and agreement with the senior officials of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs in Knin and the public security units of Benkovac, Obrovac, Donji Lapac, Gracac, Korenica, Petrinja, Dvor na Uni, Glina, Vojnic, and Vrginmost. The Krajina's top policemen discussed technical matters in the domain of public security affairs (they are short of forms for personal documents, drivers' licenses, identity cards, passports, and so on). It was concluded that the police and special-purpose units have been doing their job superbly.

Mention was made in the same meeting that criminal charges had been filed against Ivan Brzoja, former commander of the Knin police station (now chief of police in Zadar), because of terrorism and crimes.

Babic and Macura Off to The Hague Again

BORBA has unofficially learned that Dr. Milan Babic, prime minister of SAO Krajina, and Prof. Lazar Macura, minister of information in the Krajina government, set off yesterday for The Hague for the renewed talks with the EC representative, Ambassador Henri Veinens.

Because of his departure for The Hague, yesterday Babic did not chair the meeting of the government of SAO Krajina, but it was chaired instead by Deputy Prime Minister Risto Matkovic. The government took under consideration the way in which the Krajina's economy is being organized under wartime conditions.

Serbia

Foreign Minister Jovanovic Addresses Assembly

AU2711182391 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1634 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Speech by Vladislav Jovanovic, foreign minister of the Republic of Serbia, at the Serbian Assembly session in Belgrade—live, broadcast in progress]

[Text] ... our government (?about) relations with foreign countries was focused on the following points: First, the

Yugoslav crisis and different aspects of its internationalization; second, the development of bilateral contacts and cooperation with some countries, particularly those who with direct interests in and influence on our situation; third, investing efforts with a view to improving the general image of Serbia and its policy and of the people and citizens of Serbia.

In this respect, of course, the most substantial activity was in regard to The Hague Conference—that is, different efforts and initiatives made from various directions with a view to halting enmity in Croatia and strengthening the so-called negotiating process. With the mandate given to us by this parliament, we left for The Hague to attend the fifth summit, at which we tried to improve on the latest version [as heard] by consolidating it with the essential positions that (?we) have agreed upon here. These are that Yugoslavia exists; that nobody has either the right or capability to erase it from the political map of the world; that all political options are equal; that all Yugoslav peoples and their republics are equal in establishing the way their states will be constituted in the future; and that the special status for the Serbian people in the two Krajinas in Croatia must mean fully ensured freedom on these territories under the full protection of the international community, in the sense of recognizing and accepting the character of free territories on the basis of a contract.

Regarding these issues, our delegation—that is, the president of the republic—had a very resolute but yet clear and cooperative approach. Along with that, we tried to be constructive about other parts of this document. Unfortunately, as is known, these efforts have not been successful, because not only the Presidency but also four republics opposed this approach of ours to these principled provisions, after which the conference was adjourned indefinitely with the explanation that one must first wait for the war in Croatia to at least calm down, if not to stop and then see how the EC will react to such a development of the conference.

The EC was consistent in following up the ultimatum which it had sent to Serbia and the Yugoslav Army at the beginning of last month. This time it adopted a new declaration in which it introduced a series of sanctions against Yugoslavia. Serbia and the Yugoslav Army were not singled out in particular. It was Yugoslavia which was called to account. By this, however, the EC indirectly admitted that it was wrong when it said that Yugoslavia did not exist, because this time it was in fact Yugoslavia that it marked as an international subject that should suffer the consequences of the sanctions that had been introduced.

We made public statements about this, and I would not like to waste your time and abuse your attention. I would only like to say that we categorically rejected that declaration as unacceptable, too, that is to say, its content, from both the point of view of our dignity as an independent and sovereign state and the point of view of the rules and principles of the work of The Hague conference, which proceed from the mandate given by the CSCE and the United Nations that the conference should only provide good offices, which means that the conference should offer help to the Yugoslav federal units and not act as an arbiter, pass judgments, and even less so to dictate or punish.

Such reaction by our republic, I would say, was favorably received not only domestically, but also in many countries which are members of that community and which had been quite noncommittal in their contacts with us. These countries then began to apologize and justify their previous actions in having to accept the document as a joint product of the community in the name of solidarity and the common, unified foreign policy.

Another event, I would say, completely changed the negative thrust of the work of The Hague conference, namely the request by the SFRY Presidency to the United Nations to send UN peacekeeping forces to the Croatian battlefields.

This demand has to a great extent disturbed the plans of those circles in the EC and beyond and, of course, in some parts of our country who were already rejoicing at their success in managing to completely push our republic against the wall, pillory it, isolate it from the international public, and leave it to face economic exhaustion and starvation. I say that it has disturbed these plans because it immediately provoked the interest of all the more important and influential and, I would also say, more serious and responsible actors in the situation in Yugoslavia and in the way to overcome it through political means. Thus, this was soon followed by positive reactions from individual leading politicians and immediately afterwards, Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance arrived in Yugoslavia with a view to examining the feeling of all Yugoslav sides about bringing in UN peacekeeping forces.

During these meetings—and there were several of them, several with Vance and Carrington and the most recent one in Geneva with Vance and UN Under Secretary Goulding—the basic questions were as follows: Whether there is a possibility of really stopping the war as a condition both for the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces and the resumption of The Hague conference; whether the peacekeeping forces would be deployed along the line of battle contact [bojni dodir], that is, the green line, or in some other way; and there were, of course, various other aspects of bringing peacekeeping forces into a country which, as is known, are very numerous and concern a complex procedure in the Security Council and contacts of the Security Council with member-countries who express their wish and readiness not only to send the forces but finance them.

It goes without saying that also discussed on this occasion were those problems which caused difficulties in the work of The Hague conference—above all, the key problem of whether Yugoslavia exists or not and whether

the Yugoslav republics and peoples who want to continue their joint association in Yugoslavia should do so in a country which will be called Yugoslavia or something else.

Of course, in all these talks we very clearly and decisively explained our position. We cooperated and took an active part in talks to explain our position as one which is absolutely based on law, legitimacy, and the status quo situation, because, despite all its weaknesses, Yugoslavia is still the only international subject recognized by the United Nations, the CSCE, and the Nonaligned Movement. These facts simply must be taken into account as the starting basis for any talk on resolving the state-political crisis in Yugoslavia.

We think that in this direction we succeeded in making the other side understand us better and more readily approach the possibilities of a more flexible stand that would not contest the existence of Yugoslavia, and even less so the right of the peoples and republics to remain in a common state, in Yugoslavia.

We must say that the word people, and not just the word republic, is still the word that causes doubts and fears that our republic may be hiding behind it some of its expansionist intentions toward some other republics.

Of course, we have tried energetically to remove such doubts and anxiety, because we simply do not have such intentions. However, we have very clear and resolute intentions to protect the groups of Serbian people living outside the Republic of Serbia but still in the common state of Yugoslavia, and whose basic existential and national rights are endangered politically, physically, and militarily. Our impression is that our view was received with more understanding, even though not always with approval. We hope that in further talks with our foreign collocutors, however, we will manage to convince them even more that the Yugoslav republics and other peoples have nothing to fear from our republic and the Serbian people, that what we want and demand for us, we also acknowledge for others. This is the only way to find not only just but lasting solutions to our crisis which would lead to a stable peace and conditions for a different organization and establishment of relations among the present Yugoslav federal units, whether they decide in favor of independence or remaining in the joint state of Yugoslavia.

Regarding the talks with Vance, Goulding [Jovanovic corrects himself] and Carrington, especially with Cyrus Vance, I must say that these talks made a significant progress. Not only have they made our views better understood, but have also brought closer the views on the main issues that are yet to be resolved in order to enable the arrival of foreign peacekeeping forces. First of all, we renewed the agreement, or to be more precise, we signed yet another, the 14th, cease-fire agreement. According to what is happening now, this agreement has a better chance of finally becoming part of our reality. I said a better chance rather than every chance, because the Croatian side is still trying to provoke the federal Army and, by shooting on some Serbian villages, to cause new clashes which it would use later as an excuse for not observing this truce.

We believe, however, that this time the reasons that favor political solutions rather than those brought about by force, imposition, and continuation of the war will prevail in Zagreb, too. We believe that it will finally be understood that the war is not paying dividends to Croatia either, and that all sides' arguments must be presented in the negotiating process in which law and arguments rather than power, force, and interests [interesi] will be the decisive factors in finding these mutually acceptable and final solutions to the disputes dividing us.

Vance should visit Yugoslavia at the beginning of next week for a new round of talks. These talks will probably follow the decision of the Security Council on accepting the SFRY Presidency request on the deployment of peace forces in Croatia. I say they will probably follow that decision because this is yet to happen. It could even happen tonight, tomorrow, or the day after. In any case, things are moving in this direction and, unless the Croatian forces significantly violate the agreement on truce, we can reasonably expect this decision to be adopted by the United Nations. After that we could witness more rapid work on an agreement on modalities and achieving full consent on all major aspects of that question by all interested parties in Yugoslavia.

In parallel to these activities concerning the crisis and its solution, we also intensified activities with other countries. The aim of these activities was to achieve two things: First, to more fully and convincingly explain our position to these countries, if this is possible, as well as our positions concerning the crisis and how it is being resolved; second, to consolidate and, if possible, expand bilateral cooperation, above all in economic matters, (?border trade), and so forth. In this sense we held full and I would say substantive and useful talks with Hungary, Romania, Great Britain, and Switzerland. We had opportunities to talk about many of these issues with the representatives or politicians of the CSFR, Great Britain, France, and Greece.

In the coming period, we are to have talks at higher and lower levels also with a series of other countries, such as Great Britain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and the United States. In all these contacts, we have gotten the impression that our stands have generally been better understood and in the case of some partners accepted as well, sometimes completely, sometimes partly, depending on the particular partner and his attitude toward our country.

As concerns Hungary, which is our neighbor and is also very important for many historical or present reasons, we above all tried to calm the tension and reduce the high temperature in our relations in order to return cooperation more firmly to those positive historical

achievements that have maintained links between us, brought us closer to each other, and made us rely on one another. We also tried to make the Hungarian side as neutral as possible regarding the Yugoslav crisis, something that one could not say about its behavior over a long period of time, particularly during the last 12 months.

We were assured that Hungary completely understands that this is a mutual interest and not only the interest of one side and that in its future moves Hungary will pay attention to such an interest, which is not only our interest, but its interest as well, so I expect that on this basis—along with calming our crisis, stopping the war, and intensifying the process of negotiations—we will also be able to normalize bilateral cooperation with Hungary and to employ the two countries' potentials in order to realize the deals that we have so far either contracted or agreed upon. Some achievements have perhaps been made, such as opening new border crossings and reaching agreements between the two armies, I mean our federal Army and theirs, on creating a kind of a buffer zone along the border with a view to avoiding undesired incidents. There are also other indications that with joint efforts, endeavors, and attention both on the part of our governments and on the part of the media—which also has an important responsibility in creating this better climate— we could direct our relations and cooperation toward the level they were on before the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis and could do so slowly and without new problems.

As concerns Romania, which is our another neighbor with which we also have many common points—among other things, the fact that we have never had any wars with it—we, above all the president of our government, have had very specific talks about the development of economic and other relations, as well as the opportunity to acquaint the Romanian side in detail with our perception of the Yugoslav crisis and our activities and efforts to stop the war and increase the chances of a more successful continuation of the negotiation process in The Hague or outside it, depending on which channel turns out to be more successful.

It is not only our impression but also our firm belief that Romania has remained a friendly country toward us, that nothing could alter its position, and that we can continue to count on further cooperation and understanding of this neighboring and friendly country, and vice verse.

As regards Great Britain, this important country, which has the richest experience in following crises such as ours and which has succumbed least to the temptations of fishing in murky waters, as is unfortunately being done by some other members of the EC, we wanted to fully explain to it our attitudes and views, to explain to it that calming the crisis in Yugoslavia, in the sense of establishing a just, lasting, and stable peace, is in the general interest, and not only in the interest of the peoples who live in Yugoslavia, and that giving in to secessionist and other ambitions, above all to those that want to abolish Yugoslavia, would directly challenge stability and peace in Europe, and would definitely mark the end of what is being referred to as the development of the new European order.

As regards this, our impression is that the British collocutors, above all their parliamentarians—who demonstrated that they were very well informed not only about our crisis, but about its long history—considered our stands in a very serious and responsible manner, and that they understood better than others that Serbia is certainly not the one that is causing problems or threatening neighboring peoples and republics, but that it is in fact the opposite, that Serbia is a federal unit that is most European in the sense of its real endeavor to preserve both a high level of integration in Yugoslavia and the main preconditions for Yugoslavia's subsequent and easier integration into Europe.

Our impression is also that the British public, too, was able to more directly hear through the media the real truth about us, about the war in Croatia, about what preceded it, and that this, together with the efforts made by our side earlier, significantly contributed toward Great Britain as a whole no longer being among those countries that are pronouncedly negative when it comes to Serbia.

In Switzerland, which was also extensively infected with this virus of unobjectively viewing Serbia and proclaiming everything that is happening in Yugoslavia as being a result of some innate Serbian nationalistic negative policy, we had two aims: first to alter Switzerland's view about this and to make it, if not cancel, at least neutralize its declaration that was passed in August of this year with which it seriously wounded not only Serbia but also the national feelings of the Serbian people, as well as to secure better treatment and an improved position for numerous citizens of Serbia in this country, of which there are some 80,000 plus some 40,000-50,000 seasonal workers, above all our citizens from Kosovo.

In this respect we were given assurances that Switzerland would not take a discriminatory stand against our seasonal workers, as it had announced in one of its earlier decisions, and that it would ensure that our citizens who live there permanently—I would say that this number is not small; these citizens are mainly people with a sound education—do not feel uncomfortable or threatened because of such a Swiss policy, as a large number of our citizens have been complaining in our diplomatic offices.

In this respect, the foreign minister himself promised that he would issue a statement and indirectly remove the very negative accents in the declaration passed by the Swiss Government at the end of August. We believe that this statement has already been issued, although this has not been confirmed yet.

Regarding the talks that he held with the representatives of other countries, above all, the parliamentarians, as

well as some government members—Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, and Greece—these talks were conducted in order to explain our position and influence the stands of these countries, and to further strengthen bilateral cooperation, above all with the countries such as Greece, with which, as you know, we have very good and developed relations, and which has been confirming itself at these difficult times as a traditional friend of Serbia and the Serbian people.

We are still to pay visits, both high and lower level visits, to a number of other countries. These visits, together with those that have already been made in the past and the ones that I mentioned, will complete a plan of visits and contacts with the countries in which we are primarily interested at present so that, in this way, we can not only break this information and political blockade and get out of the isolation that some countries are trying to impose on us, but also to make partners of these countries which, as was claimed until very recently, had reserved, even hostile stands toward us—partners who would both understand us and strive to explain our position to others in the organizations or alliances to which they belong.

Meetings with European and other countries of the CSCE have not reduced our interest in contacts and meetings with other countries that are members of the Nonaligned Movement. It is in fact with these countries that we held a series of group meetings, through meetings with their ambassadors. We explained to them in detail our position and informed them about the progress made at the Hague conference so far. We also expressed our concern with the efforts made by the [European] Community and some other countries, such as the Vatican and others, whose aim is to declare Yugoslavia nonexistent, to abolish it, and to build some other states on its foundations, which they would then manipulate in the way it suits them.

I must say that the countries that came into being from previous relations of dependency with former empires have demonstrated the greatest understanding and sympathy for our stand. They all promised that in this respect they will publicly express their political stand and oppose attempts to make unjustifiable accusations against Yugoslavia, and thus Serbia, and, in contravention of international law, the UN Charter, the CSCE, and so forth, to simply declare a country non-existent, that is to say, to abolish it.

Finally, our activities were constantly coordinated with the daily activities of the media of numerous foreign countries. This is not an appropriate place to talk about how many of them. We believe that these daily efforts in their own way contributed to the fact that the picture of our republic, our politics, and our stance in the current crisis, is gradually and qualitatively improving. This is demonstrated by the first signs, the first positive commentaries in the foreign press, as well as by reports that even the officials of individual countries are beginning to take a more balanced stand toward our crisis and that they are showing more understanding in their view of us and in taking a stand on our politics and our position in this crisis.

I can conclude that although we have not come very far in improving the overall picture people have of us, we have, nevertheless, made some progress recently. The extent of this progress is less significant than the fact that it heralds the true progress that we expect to achieve in the future. What is also important is that this positive move has taken place, and is still taking place, not only in the public opinion of these countries but also in the official circles of their governments and representative bodies.

Therefore, by continuing with the policy of peace and cooperation, and by persuading people that we are a factor for stability and not a factor for instability in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans, we will also be able to persuade other countries that they were wrong to single us out from other Yugoslav republics in a negative sense, and that they were even more wrong to hit us with a stick and try to tie us permanently to a pillar of shame.

Finally, to recap, one of the proofs that this was wrong is that the EC failed in implementing its policy of punishing Yugoslavia, that is to say Serbia, because the stick it used to hit us—the oil embargo—was not approved by the UN Security Council. They made two attempts during the preliminary consultations to get the Council's members on their side, but on both occasions they encountered a firm wall of resistance, primarily from all the Non- Aligned members, as well as from the Soviet Union and China.

So they gave up in the end, or at least froze the proposal contained in their resolution, which was very clumsy and unacceptable, and they instead agreed to a new resolution on sending peace troops to Yugoslavia.

This is the proof that the policies of the SFRY Presidency were right and that this step was taken in due time. [sentence as heard] It is also the proof that the international community is increasingly interested in peace and a political solution for the Yugoslav crisis and not in the escalation of the crisis or in pushing this crisis into a much bigger, and perhaps even more dangerous, uncertainty of war, which would have probably occurred had the policy of EC pressures, ultimata, and dictates been accepted by the UN Security Council. Thank you. [applause]

Volunteer Comments on Croatian Guard Atrocities

92BA0130B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 91 p 9

[Article by Mirko Bekic: "Soldier's Incidental Story: Do Not Pick Up Anything, Brother"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] You walk through the woods, and there is a gold watch lying on the ground. Painted. Someone puts it on

their arm, and later on—boom, the arm is gone. On the grass, a gold lighter. If you pick it up, your hand is gone. You pick up a forgotten transistor radio, turn it on, and your head is gone. The scoundrels have destroyed everything....

The highway to Sid is eerily deserted—it is a road to nowhere. I am driving a friend to Ruma and Simanovci to visit close relatives and a young victim from the front. It is like a runway where no airplanes are landing. At an intersection, a sign bearing the inscription "Zagreb," exposed to the sun, in clear view. Part of the unreal decor. Friday, 1 November.

I am stopped by a police patrol as soon as I get off the Simanovci road and onto the highway. I expected that the young policeman would inspect my papers and the trunk of my car. I did not expect him to ask, with a pleading voice, whether I could transport a soldier returning from the front back to Belgrade. I say yes, of course. We make room for his two duffel bags. "Do not worry, there are no explosives in them," the policeman says. And he was right, except for an automatic rifle, maybe two.

Each in His Own Trench

The story that follows is a spontaneous dialogue with this tall and slender man from Sumadija, who was around 25 years old. He does not know that he is talking to a journalist, nor did I reveal that to him at the end of the trip. I do not think that he would take offense at this. I draw his words out carefully, as if unraveling a skein of sensitive and obscure fabric. Z.S. is from a village near Topola, a pure-blooded Serb whose mind is permeated with the Sumadija region. A volunteer.

"I reported last summer, when some people came around and rallied us together. I am not concerned with politics, and parties do not interest me. But it is right to help our own. I thought it would not take long. I see on television how strong we are and say, 'Who will keep us out of Vukovar and the little towns around there?' So I went. And it turned out to be almost 90 days."

"At the front, in combat?" I ask. "A dangerous war," I say. "According to the newspapers."

"What newspapers? There is nothing in them. Has anyone reported that a few days ago, during an attack on Bogdanovci, we had 49 dead and 78 wounded volunteers? Those of us from Topola somehow came out OK, while the ones from Kragujevac were decimated. I do not know how many of ours they captured, but we took about 80 of theirs. No one could even count the number of soldiers from the Croatian National Guard Corps [ZNG] and Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs who were killed. Neither our forces nor theirs gather them up. We slaughtered each other, and then we returned to our trenches, and they to theirs. And what do you mean, 'a dangerous war'? I do not know whether this is war. I have never fought in a war before. This is butchery, murder, dismemberment."

"Are all the reports about massacres true?"

"They are, and they are much more heinous. God forbid that you should be caught by the ZNG. They are cutthroats, utterly ruthless. They impaled one of ours on a spit and left him there, still alive, for 12 hours. We could see him. I will tell you about anything. I do not know what kind of army this is, what kind of people these Croats are. When we capture them, we see that there are all kinds, and that they are almost all mercenaries. Some Hungarians, some from who knows where. They are not, as they would say, any sort of real army, but each one is an especially skilled soldier. They do all kinds of work, they know all kinds of things. Who knows where all over the world they have engaged in murder. Their snipers are deadly during nighttime target practice. We do not even have any, except perhaps for those that we have seized. We get together in the evenings to drink coffee and warm ourselves a little by a covered fire, but some people simply collapse... really.... You walk through the woods, and there is a gold watch lying on the ground! Any kind of gold, painted! Someone puts it on their arm, and later on—boom, the arm is gone! The exact time.... On the grass, a gold lighter, a wallet. You pick it up—and your hand is gone. You come across a forgotten transistor radio. You pick it up, turn it on—and your head is gone! The scoundrels have destroyed everything! Do not pick up anything, brother!"

"Are they really that well-equipped?"

"Yes. Their light weaponry is better than ours—automatic rifles and mortars. The Kalashnikovs and the ones from 'Red Flag' are not bad. But the ones that they call 'Singapores' are better in at least two regards. They are lighter, weighing only around 2.5 kilograms, and they do not heat up quickly. I can fire a thousand rounds and it is still lukewarm. When we killed some of theirs, I turned in my automatic rifle and since then have had two 'Singapores.' But we found all sorts of things on our captives—from small dum-dum bullets to drugs. How much drugs? A lot. Everyone had some."

Pantic's Bravery

"Be honest with me, son. What do you do with the prisoners? Do you take vengeance on them?"

"We do not dismember them, we do not torture them, I can guarantee that. But you cannot stop yourself from beating someone up. When we lost so many people at Bogdanovci... all of my best friends died... we beat up their captain. I myself gave him a few punches."

"Have you put your ranks in order now, organized yourselves in battle and commands? Perhaps the officers have found their bearings?"

"Officers? Look, man, for all this time, I have not seen anyone ranking higher than captain. There are not any of them anywhere, at least that is what people say. It is only to the credit of Capt. Pantic from Kragujevac. In every battle, he has been at least 20 meters ahead of the other

soldiers. The others hide in the rear lines, who knows where.... Pantic is very brave. That is why I decided to spend the night at my aunt's in Belgrade, and then visit him at the Military Medical Academy tomorrow. He was seriously wounded in battle several days ago. His leg was shattered. Several of us pulled him out, gathered together the parts of his leg, and put them in a bag. I do not know whether the doctors have been able to do anything with them."

"Do you have good accommodations, and how about food?"

"Who thinks of food? There is some.... And accommodations? That is the front. For two months I have slept in a trench, under a tank. On a tent-half. The tank protects us from mortars. When they have to fire, they pull back 15 meters behind the trench and let it rip. And we in the trenches bounce like it is a major earthquake."

We arrive in the very center of the city, dazzled. On the ground floor of the building where his aunt lives is a coffee shop, actually a large bistro. We get the soldier's duffel bags out of the trunk. He says, "This other one belonged to my best friend. I am taking his things to his mother. Fortunately for me, other people have already told her about her son."

We say goodbye.

"Will you be returning to the front after your leave is over?" I ask.

"I must, even if I die. Where could I run, how could I abandon them?"

I drive on. My friend and I go into a roadside cafe and reconstruct the conversation. I record the soldier's first name, last name, and nickname, and the address of his relatives in Belgrade. My editors should be aware of them, and perhaps his testimony will of use in some sort of future Balkan Nuremberg trials. When I asked the man from Sumadija how they, the soldiers, think the war will end, he said, "It won't." At the front, he said, they would be happy if some sort of international force stood between them and the other side, because then, he said, he could go home without having to divert his glance before anyone.

Government of Kosovo Republic Criticized

92BA0160B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Nov 91 p 11

[Article by R. Barjaktarevic: "Coverage in Exile"]

[Text] The leaders of the Albanian Alternative of Kosmet are now in a situation where they have almost nothing more to offer their members. Realization of "what has been agreed, written, and adopted concerning Kosovo, a republic, is the exclusive task of the government-in-exile." It is being suggested to workers without jobs and children without schools that they "remain calm" at this moment "and not be taken in by possible provocations."

Along with the promise that in the pan-Albanian assembly in Tirana on 28 November "solutions will take final form for Albanians to join Europe and the world," the leaders of the Albanian political parties (of the "coordinating body of Albanians," led by Ibrahim Rugova) are recommending to fellow Albanians "self-organization, endurance, and intractability." Facing the situation they have gotten into, following numerous promises that they have offered their membership, the leaders of the Albanian political parties have shared responsibility. After the withdrawal of most of the parties and associations from political life because of disagreements over methods of operation and evasion of responsibility for "mistakes in the steps that were taken," the entire political life of Albanians in the province was passed over to the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo and the Union of Independent Trade Unions. In addition to them, the Committee for Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights are heard from occasionally. Other associations and parties of Albanians have not been heard from for quite a long time now. Nor is anything being heard from the parties representing active resistance, such as the Parliamentary Party, the Christian Democrat Party, the Peasant Party, and the Republic Party. Either the entire job has been left to the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo and the Union of Independent Trade Unions, or Ibrahim Rugova and Hajrulah Gorani have been left as the solitary leaders with the middle stratum of the general Albanian public.

By constituting the "government of the Republic of Kosovo," Rugova and Gorani have cast off all responsibility. Now "all the moves are made by the government, which is headed by Bujar Bukoshi, secretary of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, and the ministers in exile." For everything that Rugova and Gorani "did in Europe and the world concerning possible options for a way out of the Kosmet problems, support and approval have been forthcoming." Is this removal of responsibility to fellow members of their nationality?

The future destiny of Albanians is "decided by the government of the Republic of Kosovo." There is no answer to the question of who drove Bujar Bukoshi into exile. The names of the ministers of the "Kosovo government" are not made public. We have learned from well-informed circles that all the ministerial posts except internal affairs and defense, which are still an object of contention, have been filled. Foreign affairs missions have been formed in several countries of Europe and the world, staffed mainly from the top leadership of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo and former delegates of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly. Jusuf Karakushi, former secretary of the Kosovo Secretariat for Internal Affairs, is mentioned most frequently as the future minister of internal affairs.

A certain Colonel Tom Berisha, who with like-minded supporters takes the view that the "battle for the Republic of Kosovo is to be won in Zagreb," is "envisaged" for national defense. In the opinion of ordinary people, "the minister should live here."

The government of the "Republic of Kosovo" is being proclaimed, but malicious tongues are saying that "there is no government-in-exile at all, but the decisions are made by Ibrahim Rugova with his collaborators in the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo. For them, the 'government-in-exile' is only a cover."

Yet, until just recently "everything here was as clear as on the palm of your hand." Every party and association had "its own" separate tasks. Now the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo is no longer concerned about the workers and their destiny because they have been laid off or have quit their jobs, nor are decisions about the schools being made by the "coordinating body for education and the schools." The workers, Gorani says, "are in the hands of European and world trade unions, above all the European Community, which will reinstate them in their jobs," and the "decision on the Albanian schools will be made by the Education Ministry of the Republic of Kosovo," says Dr. Fehmi Agani, vice president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo. According to him, "the idea is to divide up the instruction, the schools, and the equipment and furnishings."

Schoolchildren, according to certain sources, will start back to school on 28 November, on Albanian Republic Day and the date of the pan-Albanian assembly on unification, but "according to the system of the Republic of Kosovo, which is not hindered in the least by instruction in the Serbian language." It remains to be seen whether young Albanians will go to school and under what system, because that is "decided" by others, not by the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo and the Union of Independent Trade Unions.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Assembly of SAO of Northern Bosnia Organized

92BA0160A Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 20 Nov 91 p 5

[Declaration of the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Northern Bosnia: "Consequences and Causes"]

[Text] Alluding to "differing interpretations and reactions to the act of establishing and constituting the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast [SAO] of Northern Bosnia," the "Assembly" of this "Autonomous Oblast" has issued the following declaration:

"The Serbian people of 17 opstinas have established and constituted the Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Northern Bosnia as an expression of their political will, not as a result of its demographic pattern and the procentual share in the total population of those opstinas, and has proclaimed that autonomous oblast an inseparable part of the federal state of Yugoslavia.

"The political will of the other two constituent nationalities living on the territory of these 17 opstinas is their sovereign right, which the Serbian people and this Assembly will not judge by the numerical size of those nationalities, but through the prism of realization of the equality of the sovereign nationalities of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serbian people have merely confirmed their right to self-determination, expressed earlier, and in that act of confirmation they have done no injury to any aspect of the equality of the other nationalities. However, those nationalities and their political parties that apart from this right also wish to exercise the right of nationalities to secede may do so only in the name of those nationalities, but not in the name and to the detriment of the Serbian people and its equality with the others.

"The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina has never bound up the sovereignty and equality of any nationality with its numerical size, either within an opstina or on the territory of the republic or on the territory of the federal state, nor has it ever taken a political stand to the effect that the percentage of any nationality's share in the total population on any territory determines the degree of sovereignty and equality of any nationality. Because the conclusion can be drawn from the content of all the reactions expressed that the equality of a nationality depends precisely on its numerical size, it is becoming clear why the Assembly, government, and Presidency of the Republic have adopted the method of majority rule in decisionmaking, but it is also quite clear why the Assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Hercegovina and of all the assemblies of the Serbian autonomous oblasts had to be constituted as the only bodies through which the sovereign and equal Serbian people can express their political will without fear of being voted down. When all those who on the principle of the numerical size of a nationality challenge the Assembly of SAO of Northern Bosnia and thereby also the equality of the Serbian people realize that the equality of a nationality either exists or does not exist, the Serbian people will quickly understand that the grounds no longer exist for seeking other forms of expression of their political will.

"Those who erase the Serbian nationality's attribute as a sovereign and constituent nationality through amendments and supplements to the republic Constitution, those who take away its equality by voting it down in the Assembly, government, and Presidency, those who take away from it the joint federal state by adoption of a declaration and memorandum in the Assembly, those who offer it chaos by failing to comply with the federal Constitution and law and by blockading the operation of federal bodies and agencies, those who offer it ethnic armies by anathematizing the Yugoslav People's Army, and those who reduce it to the level of the so-called Serbian nationality by using the phrase 'so-called

Assembly and so-called SAO' have no right whatsoever to proclaim the political response of that nationality destructive, hegemonistic, ruinous, destabilizing, Serbian-expansionist, unconstitutional, and unlawful.

"The Serbian nationality no longer wishes to bear the consequences, but to remove the causes.

"The response of the Serbian people in the plebiscite that has been held gives the Serbian Democratic Party the right to act in its name and on its behalf, and the results achieved make it incumbent upon that party and the constituted bodies to wage a fight to carry out the political program and realize the strategic interests of the Serbian nationality on the basis of equality and sovereignty," concludes the declaration sent to our paper, to TV Sarajevo, and to YUTEL [Yugoslav Television].

Controversy Over Dismissal of Serbs Examined

92BA0131A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by M. Lucic: "Strong Reaction to Allegation by Radovan Karadzic Concerning Dismissal of Policemen of Serbian Nationality in Zavidovici: Basket of Truths and Lies"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] of Bosnia-Hercegovina refutes the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] with concrete data, while the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] says that the matter constitutes "shameless disinformation of the public."

Sarajevo—Last weekend in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, raised a great cloud of dust when he said that "at the Public Security Station in Zavidovici, all policemen of Serbian nationality have been dismissed, as have been employees in the criminal service and in state security." Karadzic made this charge in a broadcast of the show "Dialogues" on Sarajevo Television that featured three leaders of national parties.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina immediately announced that there was no truth to what Karadzic said. In its announcement, the MUP points out "that this is not the first case of malicious disinformation of the public concerning the work of this ministry from the same source." The Ministry of Internal Affairs refutes Karadzic's allegations about the firing of Serbian policemen in Zavidovici with concrete data on the national composition of the population in that commune and of employees at the Public Security Station in Zavidovici.

Specifically, the MUP alleges that the population of Zavidovici is 60.1 percent Muslim, 20.4 percent Serbian, 13.2 percent Croatian, and 6.3 percent others, and that the employees at the Public Security Station of that commune comprise seven Croats, when there should be 10, 21 Muslims, when there should be 44, 16 Serbs, when there should be 14, and 20 others, when there should be four. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina emphasizes in particular that its policy is that not a single employee of that Ministry should lose his job due to his national affiliation, especially not in the manner that the SDS leader is attempting to portray.

The same day, the Party of Democratic Action reacted strongly to Karadzic's statement that Serbs are being dismissed and Muslims are being appointed, calling this "shameless disinformation of the public." "Through a shameless distortion of the facts, Radovan Karadzic is attempting to win the public over to his exclusive and biased goals," the SDA emphasizes in its reaction.

Also the same day, the chief of the Public Security Station, Velid Hamidicevic, appearing on the Sarajevo Television news journal, produced the same data on the national composition of his employees, also maintaining that not a single Serbian employee had been fired.

In the series of reactions yesterday, the Serbian Democratic Party also spoke up, alleging that its chairman spoke the truth. The SDS emphasizes that Karadzic was slandered, that the Serbian nation is once again being defiled, and that "the aim of this campaign by anti-Serbian staffs and their subordinate institutions and individuals was not to deny the facts associated with the dismissal of Serbian personnel in the MUP of Zavidovici, but rather to demonize the Serbian nation and its political leadership by whatever means."

In its public statement, the SDS puts forth concrete facts to the effect that based on decisions made on 31 October and signed by Hajro Hodzic, the following people were fired: Zlatko Nedic, the deputy commander of the Public Security Station of Zavidovici, Radenko Djuricic, the chief of communications, and Rade Grbic, the director of defense preparations. The SDS contends that they were replaced by employees of Muslim nationality, Muhamed Mahovac and Nezir Music. "Obviously, in solving the anti-Serbian "puzzle," the gentlemen from the SDA and MUP of Bosnia-Hercegovina are not afraid to engage in the most heinous deception," the SDS says in yesterday's statement.

The SDS demands that both the SDA and the MUP of Bosnia-Hercegovina apologize publicly to the Serbian people, the SDS, and Karadzic, and it urges Sarajevo Television, just as it interviewed the figures in question at the Public Security Station of Zavidovici, to do a follow-up story on the dismissed employees of Serbian nationality.

It is hard to decide who is right, because both the MUP and the responsible people in Zavidovici are presenting concrete facts, but so is the SDS. Everyone claims to be telling the truth, and the question is how to clarify this matter. But like similar matters, it too is having a destructive effect on an already nationally divided Bosnia.

Muslim Leader Interviewed on Border Division

92BA0122B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Oct 91 p 11

[Interview with Dr. Ismet Hadziosmanovic, president of the Democratic Action Party for Hercegovina, by Milan Sutalo; place and date not given: "A Partitioned Bosnia, Partitioned Croats"]

[Text] "Following The Hague agreement, which has fundamentally altered the political situation in Yugoslavia and thereby the position of Muslims as well, and it has also defined Bosnia-Hercegovina as a sovereign republic with international attributes, no kind of redrawing of borders by military force comes into consideration. Europe guarantees us that. Second, it is clearly evident from that agreement that the Serbian nationality in Bosnia-Hercegovina cannot have any special status, because that would be contrary to the position concerning the Serbs in Croatia, who are precisely an ethnic minority and in conflict with the Republic of Croatia, which is not the case here. The Serbs here are neither in conflict with anyone, nor are they an ethnic minority, but a constituent segment of the republic. We place our reliance, then, on The Hague agreement and believe that there will be no war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Which is to say that we have not been reflecting, nor are we now reflecting, on demarcation and division of this region, that is, of Bosnia-Hercegovina. And I see no reason why Croats should be ready to divide territory, because they are the ones that that would place in a more difficult position, because that would partition them still more." This statement was made for BORBA by Dr. Ismet Hadziosmanovic, president of the Democratic Action Party [SDA] for Hercegovina, and a member of that party's Executive Committee for Yugoslavia, and was among his comments on the proposals of Stjepan Kljujic concerning an agreed line of demarcation with the Serbs.

In the Vicinity of the Imagined Borders

[Sutalo] Does that mean that you are precluding the possibility of a drawing of borders by force in this region?

[Hadziosmanovic] No, on the contrary, it is clearly evident from the speech by General Kadijevic that the arrival of the reservists in Hercegovina is aimed at finding certain imagined borders in the immediate vicinity. After all, if the Army were here in order to prevent interethnic conflicts, then it should above all protect the Muslim nationality, which is in a minority in that region. But precisely the opposite has been happening—under the cover of the Army, it is the houses of the Muslims that have been burned, the mosques that have been demolished, they have been forcibly mobilized, and members of our parties have been beaten. So, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Army's purpose in being here is quite different. And if we had not been behaving sensibly, Mostar would long ago have been turned into a Vukovar or Pakrac.

[Sutalo] Are you afraid that the Muslims in eastern Hercegovina, because the process of building a Serbian state in this region is continuing in spite of everything, could be transformed from a nationality into an ethnic minority?

[Hadziosmanovic] I am certain that that insane idea has no support, above all of the Serbian people, because only half of all the Serbs in Hercegovina live in the eastern part. If such a state were created, the Serbian people would lose the most, because that would signify a severing of connections with the remainder of the Serbian nation. Just think of the Serbs from Mostar having to go to school in Trebinje, of having to go to Trebinje to see a doctor. At the same time, there are indissoluble economic, political, cultural, kinship, and other relations. In addition, that isolation would signify ruination for the Serbian people, because in eastern Hercegovina there are hardly any significant natural and economic resources, and they are economically dependent on other parts of Hercegovina and the republic. Such a state would be a camp for everyone. And thanks to the Army and Vucurevic, the Serbian people have lost Dubrovnik once and for all, and I do not believe that they will allow Mostar to be lost as well.

We Do Not Want Conflicts With the Serbs

[Sutalo] Vucurevic, however, believes that the border of Serbian Hercegovina is not located on the Neretva, by virtue of Mostar. Is there a basis for that thesis in the figures on the ethnic composition on the left bank of Mostar, Capljina?

[Hadziosmanovic] According to the last population census, there were 10,000 Serbs on the left bank of Mostar, 20,500 Muslims, and 6,500 Croats. But aside from the lack of an ethnic basis for that assertion, there is no cultural nor traditional basis.

[Sutalo] If in the valley of the Neretva, which has a total population of 230,000, there are 180,000 Muslims and Croats, he resorts to force, will those two nationalities conclude a defensive military alliance? HERCEGOVACKI TJEDNIK writes that it already exists.

[Hadziosmanovic] We are against all paramilitary or political formations, and we do not intend to include any military alliances whatsoever. I think the Croats have no need for that either. We will never provoke a conflict with the Serbs, but we do not preclude the possibility that there will be attempts to capture the Neretva valley. But that cannot be done overnight. Those would be initial attempts. It takes time to capture any territory, and do not forget that Europe is able to intervene within 24 hours. A battle can be won, but not a war. And that is why I believe that reason will prevail. After all, such things can bring the greatest misfortune on the Serbian people.

Misrepresentations in Sandzak Ethnic Map Cited

92BA0130C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4 Nov 91 p 12

[Article by Dr. Slavenko Terzic of the History Institute of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art: "Reaction: Dr. Slavenko Terzic on 'Ethnic Map of Sandzak'; Misuse of Cartography"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Cartography has always been in vogue whenever it was necessary to support one's own pretensions and challenge someone else's. This is once again the case with Sandzak "cartographers."

Cartography is currently in vogue, and that has always been the case when it was necessary to support one's own pretensions and challenge someone else's. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, dozens of ethnic maps of the Balkans emerged, many of which were intended to directly serve political pretensions, in many cases ignoring the facts and the actual ethnic situation. The "Ethnic Map of the Sandzak," drawn up by the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and published by Titograd's POBJEDA on 28 October followed by BORBA on 29 October, is a drastic example of the misuse of cartography, if in fact it is even possible to call this cartography.

There are two major abuses by the authors of the "Ethnic Map of the Sandzak." The first is that the published map of the Sandzak extends far beyond the borders of the area that has been considered the Sandzak during the 20th century, and it even goes beyond the borders of the Sandzak of Novi Pazar during the days of Ottoman rule. It is obvious that the intention is to create some sort of new state that would be bigger than all the existing ones that have been known by that name. The Sandzak enjoyed autonomy from 1943 to 1945 with eight administrative districts over whose territory the authority of the Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of the Sandzak extended. Today, these are the following opstinas: Priboj, Prijepolje, Nova Varos, Sjenica, Tutin, and Novi Pazar (in Serbia), and Pljevlja and Bijelo Polje (in Montenegro). This is the only territory that has ever enjoyed any sort of autonomy. Under Ottoman rule, during the period after the Congress of Berlin (1878), part of this area was assigned to the Sandzak of Pljevlja, and part of it went to the Sandzak of Novi Pazar. The Novi Pazar kaza [Turkish administrative term] was then annexed to the Sandzak of Pristina, while the Beranski kaza was for a time part of the Sandzak of Pec. Upon liberation from Ottoman rule in 1912, this area was divided administratively into the Sandzaks of Pljevlja and Sjenica.

After the Balkan wars, the border between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro was established, and this division remains in force today as the border between the two republics.

The second major abuse concerns the statistical data on the number of inhabitants of this area, and even more so the data about national composition. The map includes inaccurate data, which are not hard to verify in the official reports of the competent republican statistical offices. Because of this, the question arises of what sort of data can in fact be expected in cases where they are harder to verify, such as, for example, the results of a referendum on autonomy. In some cases, the map contains drastic falsifications. In Pljevlja, for example, the Muslim share of the total population for the last three censuses was as follows: 1971—18.2 percent; 1981—16.1 percent; 1991—17.7 percent. According to the "Ethnic Map of the Sandzak," the Muslim population accounts for 30 percent. This means that the percentage increased a little less than 13 percent. Or another drastic example: Plav opstina, which has never been part of the Sandzak anyway. According to the 1981 census, the Muslim share of the total population of Plav was 51.9 percent, while according to the results of the 1991 census, this percentage is 58.3 percent. The shares of the other nations in 1991 were as follows: Albanians 20.07 percent, Montenegrins 18.1 percent, Serbs 1.4 percent, etc. According to the "Ethnic Map of the Sandzak," however, the share of the Muslim population in Plav opstina is 80 percent. It is obvious that this figure was obtained by combining the Muslims and Albanians and adding a few percentage points. And so on, without enumerating all the examples. It is interesting that the creators of the "Ethnic Map of the Sandzak" were well-informed of the statistical data on the total number of inhabitants in the area that they designated "the Sandzak"; according to the latest census, the total number of inhabitants is 440,789, which they rounded off to 440,000. But they increased the figure for the Muslim population by 22,840 inhabitants! It is obvious that this is an attempt to falsely represent the Muslim population as being larger than it really is. The logical question arises: What kind of cartography and political conception is this, based as it is on crude falsifications? Especially since all of this can be verified quite simply.